



Log # 2024-0008720

FINAL SUMMARY REPORT¹

I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

On December 6, 2024, the Civilian Office of Police Accountability (COPA) received a complaint from [REDACTED] reporting alleged misconduct by a member of the Chicago Police Department (CPD).² [REDACTED] alleged that, earlier that day, Officer Fidel Legorreta stopped, detained, and searched him and his vehicle without justification.³ Following its investigation, COPA reached a finding of Exonerated regarding the initiation of the traffic stop and Sustained for the remaining allegations.

II. SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE⁴

At approximately 3:17 a.m. on December 6, 2024, Officer Fidel Legorreta and Officer Juan Ortiz Jr. were assisting with a response to a noise complaint as well as looking for a vehicle they had earlier seen driving recklessly.⁵ As they turned onto Leclair Avenue, they encountered a vehicle driven by [REDACTED].⁶ Officer Legorreta signaled [REDACTED] with a hand gesture to move his vehicle back; however, [REDACTED] did not comply.⁷ Officer Legorreta then flashed the headlights of the CPD vehicle at [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] activated the CPD vehicle's emergency lights, yet [REDACTED] vehicle remained stationary.⁸

Officer Legorreta exited the police vehicle and approached [REDACTED] car.⁹ He asked [REDACTED] if he understood the meaning of the emergency blue lights.¹⁰ [REDACTED] responded that he was driving in the correct direction, while Officer Legorreta was going the wrong way without his emergency

¹ Appendix A includes case identifiers such as the date, time, and location of the incident, the involved parties and their demographics, and the applicable rules and policies.

² [REDACTED] made this complaint through Sergeant Michael Kantsantonis. Sgt. Kantsantonis named additional officers on his Initiation Report (see Att. 1), but, based on the evidence, COPA only served allegations against Officer Fidel Legorreta.

³ One or more of these allegations fall within COPA's jurisdiction pursuant to Chicago Municipal Code § 2-78-120. Therefore, COPA determined it would be the primary investigative agency in this matter.

⁴ The following is a summary of what COPA finds most likely occurred during this incident. This summary utilized information from several different sources, including BWC footage, ICC footage, third-party video, police reports, civilian interviews, and officer interviews.

⁵ Att. 2, Att. 35, pg. 8, lns. 19 to 23, and pg. 12 lns. 1 to 7.

⁶ Att. 28.

⁷ Att. 2.

⁸ Att. 28 starting at 0:04

⁹ Att. 28 at 1:05.

¹⁰ Att. 18 at 2:05.

lights activated, at least initially.¹¹ When Officer Legorreta requested [REDACTED] driver's license, [REDACTED] refused to provide it and instead asked for a supervisor.¹² Officer Legorreta explained that he and his partner were responding to an emergency call. At that time, an additional police vehicle arrived and positioned itself behind [REDACTED] vehicle.

Officer Legorreta called for a supervisor. While waiting, the officers became argumentative with [REDACTED] and Officer Legorreta instructed [REDACTED] to exit his vehicle.¹³ Officer Legorreta opened [REDACTED] driver's side door, and [REDACTED] complied, exiting the vehicle.¹⁴ Officer Legorreta then handcuffed [REDACTED] conducted a protective pat down, and retrieved [REDACTED] driver's license from his front left pocket.¹⁵ Officer Legorreta searched the immediate area of [REDACTED] vehicle, including a bag located in the hatchback area.¹⁶

Sergeant Michael Katsantones arrived on scene. After officers explained the incident, Sergeant Katsantones instructed them to remove the handcuffs from [REDACTED].¹⁷ Officer Legorreta issued [REDACTED] two traffic violations and provided him with an Investigatory Stop Report receipt.¹⁸ [REDACTED] remained on scene and filed a complaint with Sergeant Katsantones.

[REDACTED] was later found not guilty of failure to yield the right of way to an emergency vehicle but guilty of failure to obey a police officer.¹⁹

III. ALLEGATIONS

Office Fidel Legorreta:

1. Initiating a traffic stop of [REDACTED] without justification.
 - Exonerated
2. Detaining [REDACTED] without justification.
 - Sustained Violation of Rules 2, 3, 6
3. Searching [REDACTED] without justification.
 - Sustained Violation of Rules 2, 3, 6, 10
4. Searching [REDACTED] vehicle, without justification.
 - Sustained, Violation of Rules 2, 3, 6

IV. CREDIBILITY ASSESSMENT

¹¹ Att. 18 starting at 2:09.

¹² Att. 18 starting at 2:20.

¹³ Att. 18 at 13:12.

¹⁴ Att. 18 at 13:14.

¹⁵ Att. 18 starting at 13:22.

¹⁶ Att. 18 starting at 14:00.

¹⁷ Att. 24 at 5:13.

¹⁸ Att. 18 at 29:46.

¹⁹ Att. 37.

The credibility of an individual relies primarily on two factors: the individual's truthfulness and the reliability of the individual's account. The first factor addresses the honesty of the individual making the statement, while the second factor speaks to the individual's ability to accurately perceive the event at the time of the incident and then accurately recall the event from memory.

This investigation did not reveal any evidence that caused COPA to question the credibility of any person who provided evidence. ██████ provided a statement to COPA, and his account of the incident was consistent with the events depicted on BWC footage and the other evidence.²⁰ The officers' statements were equally consistent and largely matched the events depicted on BWC footage and documented in the Investigatory Stop Report (ISR).²¹

V. ANALYSIS²²

A. Initiating a traffic stop

COPA finds the allegation that Officer Legorreta initiated a traffic stop of ██████ without justification, is Exonerated.

Traffic stops are seizures under the Fourth Amendment, and thus subject to the Fourth Amendment reasonableness requirement.²³ Traffic stops are analyzed under *Terry* because "the 'usual traffic stop' is more analogous to a so-called *Terry* stop than to a formal arrest."²⁴ The *Terry* test is: "(1) whether the officer's action was justified at its inception, and (2) whether it was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place."²⁵

A lawful traffic stop requires "at least [an] articulable and reasonable suspicion that the particular person stopped is breaking the law", including traffic law.²⁶ Articulable and reasonable suspicion means that the police "must be able to identify some particularized and objective basis for thinking that the person to be stopped is or may be about to engage in unlawful activity," amounting to more than a hunch.²⁷ Police need not meet the higher threshold of probable cause to perform a traffic stop, but if the stop *is* supported by probable cause, its lawfulness is still evaluated under

²⁰ Att. 9.

²¹ Att. 2.

²² For a definition of COPA's findings and standards of proof, *see* Appendix B.

²³ *Whren v. United States*, 517 U.S. 806, 809-10 (1996).

²⁴ *People v. Cosby*, 231 Ill. 2d 262, 274 (2008) (quoting *Berkemer v. McCarty*, 468 U.S. 420, 439 (1984)) (internal citation omitted).

²⁵ *People v. Bunch*, 207 Ill. 2d 7, 14 (2003) (citing *Terry v. Ohio*, 392 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1968)).

²⁶ *United States v. Rodriguez-Escalera*, 884 F.3d 661, 667-68 (7th Cir. 2018) (citing *Delaware v. Prouse*, 440 U.S. 648, 663 (1979)).

²⁷ *United States v. Miranda-Sotolongo*, 827 F.3d 663, 666 (7th Cir. 2015) (quoting *United States v. Cortez*, 449 U.S. 411, 417 (1981)).

Terry.²⁸ An officer's subjective intent does not enter into the analysis; even where officers hope to effectuate a goal unrelated to addressing a traffic violation (such as uncovering criminal activity), intent alone does not invalidate a stop that is otherwise objectively justified by reasonable articulable suspicion.²⁹

In this case, Officer Legorreta initiated the stop based on [REDACTED] failure to move out of the way when signaled to do so. The Investigatory Stop Report (ISR) indicates that [REDACTED] was cited for violating 625 ILCS 5/11-907(a)(1),³⁰ which requires drivers to slow down and, if possible, change lanes when approached by emergency vehicles displaying flashing lights. Officer Legorreta also referred to "Scott's Law" 625 ILCS 5/11- 907(c), which contains a duty to create space when approaching stationary emergency vehicles with flashing lights.

At the time of the incident, [REDACTED] was driving southbound on Leclaire Avenue, a one-way street running southbound, when he encountered Officer Legorreta driving northbound (against the flow of traffic). Officer Legorreta did not have his emergency lights activated at this time. [REDACTED] informed COPA that he was initially unsure what was occurring because the CPD vehicle's emergency lights were not on, and instead he was flashed by the vehicle's headlights.³¹ Officer Legorreta told COPA that he used a hand signal to instruct [REDACTED] to move, but due to the time of day, [REDACTED] may not have seen the gesture.³² In Car Camera (ICC) footage also shows that the two vehicles were on a narrow street, leaving limited space for [REDACTED] to move over.³³ [REDACTED] and Officer Legorreta both said [REDACTED] would have had to have reversed down the narrow street to yield to the police car.

There is, however, a general duty to obey police officers with any lawful order or direction, including their direction of traffic, which [REDACTED] failed to do. Officer Legorreta also cited [REDACTED] for violating the related statute, 625 ILCS 11-203.³⁴ COPA finds by clear and convincing evidence that Officer Legorreta's initiation of the traffic stop, was proper.

B. Detaining [REDACTED]

COPA finds the allegation that Officer Legorreta detained [REDACTED] without justification, is Sustained.

CPD defines an Investigatory stop as: "[t]he temporary detention and questioning of a person in the vicinity where the person was stopped based on Reasonable Articulable Suspicion

²⁸ *Rodriguez v. United States*, 135 S. Ct. 1609, 1617-18 (2015). See also *People v. Cosby*, 231 Ill. 2d 262, 274 (2008) ("this court and many other courts have analyzed traffic stops under *Terry* principles, regardless of whether the initial stop was supported by probable cause"); *People v. Jones*, 215 Ill. 2d 261, 271 (2005) (analyzing reasonableness under *Terry* where the officer's "initial stop of the vehicle was supported by probable cause").

²⁹ See *Whren v. United States*, 517 U.S. 806, 812 (1996).

³⁰ Att. 2.

³¹ Att. 9, pg. 9.

³² Att. 35, pg. 26, lns. 22 to 24, pg. 27, lns. 1 to 6.

³³ Att. 28.

³⁴ Att. 40. [REDACTED] was ultimately found guilty of violating this statute and sentenced to Supervision. See Att 37.

that the person is committing, is about to commit, or has committed a criminal offense.³⁵ CPD defines reasonable articulable suspicion as “an objective legal standard that is less than probable cause, but more than a hunch or general suspicion.”³⁶ Probable cause exists where the police have knowledge of facts that would lead a reasonable person to believe that a crime has occurred and that the subject has committed it.³⁷

A traffic stop must last no longer than is required for law enforcement to effectuate its “mission,” which is “to address the violation that warranted the stop, and attend to related safety concerns.”³⁸ “[O]rdinary inquiries incident to [the] stop” are lawful, falling under the rubric of “related safety concerns.”³⁹ Such inquiries include performing outstanding warrant and criminal history checks, as well as examining driver’s licenses, vehicle registrations, and proof of insurance.⁴⁰ Inquiries unrelated to the stop’s mission are lawful only if they “do not measurably extend the duration of the stop.”⁴¹

In this case, the violation of 625 ILCS 11-203 was obvious, and the officer could and should have cited [REDACTED] for that violation and sent him on his way. No additional police action was merited or required. COPA recognizes that [REDACTED] requested a supervisor respond to the scene and that this had the effect of prolonging the interaction. Even so, Officer Legorreta needlessly extended and escalated the encounter, making the detention of [REDACTED] in the totality of the circumstances, unjustified.

Further, handcuffing [REDACTED] changed the nature of the stop. “[H]andcuffing is proper during an investigatory stop only when it is a necessary restraint to effectuate the stop and foster the safety of the officers.”⁴² To handcuff a person, officers must have a sufficiently reasonable concern for officer safety.⁴³ Whether an officer’s handcuffing was reasonable depends on the totality of the circumstances.⁴⁴ Officers must have reasonable articulable suspicion to believe that their safety is in danger to handcuff persons.⁴⁵

Officer Legorreta informed COPA that several factors contributed to his decision to handcuff [REDACTED]. These included the high-crime nature of the neighborhood, the time of

³⁵ Att. 36, S04-13-09(II)(A) Investigatory Stop System (Effective July 10, 2017).

³⁶ Att. 36, S04-13-09(II)(C).

³⁷ Att. 36, S04-13-09(II)(D).

³⁸ *Rodriguez v. United States*, 575 U.S. 348, 355 (2015) (citing *Illinois v. Caballes*, 543 U.S. 405, 407 (2005)).

³⁹ *Rodriguez v. United States*, 575 U.S. 348, 355 (2015).

⁴⁰ *Rodriguez v. United States*, 575 U.S. 348, 354 (2015); See also *People v. Cummings*, 2016 IL 115769, ¶ 14 (2016).

⁴¹ *Rodriguez v. United States*, 575 U.S. 348, 355 (2015); *Caballes*, 543 U.S. at 410 (holding that it was lawful for an officer to walk a narcotics-detection dog around a vehicle while another officer issued a speeding ticket because it did not prolong the stop).

⁴² See *People v. Johnson*, 408 Ill. App. 3d 107, 113 (2010).

⁴³ *People v. Wells*, 403 Ill. App. 3d. 849, 857 (1st Dist. 2010) (citing *People v. Arnold*, 394 Ill. App. 3d 63, 71 (2nd Dist. 2009)); see also *People v. Colyar*, 2013 IL 111835, ¶ 46 (citing e.g., *United States v. Glenna*, 878 F.2d 967, 972 (7th Cir. 1989)).

⁴⁴ *People v. Colyar*, 2013 IL 111835, ¶ 32.

⁴⁵ *People v. Colyar*, 2013 IL 111835, ¶ 45.

day, ██████ resistance to the traffic stop, which led Officer Legorreta to suspect that ██████ may have been concealing a weapon. Additionally, ██████ did not initially identify himself or provide his driver's license when requested, which heightened Officer Legorreta's suspicion that ██████ may have been attempting to conceal his identity due to a suspended license or an outstanding warrant.⁴⁶ The factors, as articulated by Officer Legorreta, do not meet the requirement that the officer must have a reasonable fear for his or her safety before resorting to handcuffs during an investigatory stop.⁴⁷ The responding field sergeant, Sergeant Katsantones, implicitly recognized this in his direction at the scene to remove ██████ from the handcuffs. In the totality of the circumstances, ██████ detention by Officer Legorreta was unjustified.

C. Searching ██████

COPA finds the allegation that Officer Legorreta searched ██████ without justification, is Sustained.

CPD defines a protective pat down as: "A limited search during an investigatory stop in which a sworn member conducts a pat down of the outer clothing of a person for weapons for the protection of the sworn member or others in the area."⁴⁸ "[f]or a protective pat down, a sworn member must possess specific and articulable facts which, combined with rational inferences from these facts, reasonably warrant a belief that the suspect is armed and dangerous or reasonably suspects that the person presents a danger of attack to the sworn member or others in the area."⁴⁹ Further, if an officer who, during the pat down, "touches an object the sworn member reasonably believes is a weapon" to reach into that area of clothing and retrieve the object.⁵⁰

Officer Legorreta conducted a pat down of ██████ after he exited his vehicle. According to the Investigatory Stop Report (ISR), the pat down was performed due to ██████ showing signs of nervousness, including shaking and heavy breathing. However, "Nervousness alone cannot give rise to reasonable suspicion."⁵¹

For a Protective Pat Down, a sworn member must possess specific and articulable facts, combined with rational inferences from these facts, that the suspect is armed and dangerous or reasonably suspects that the person presents a danger of attack to the sworn member or others in the area.⁵²

⁴⁶ Att. 18 starting at 7:47.

⁴⁷ COPA acknowledges that 625 ILCS 5/6-112 and Chicago Municipal Code section 9-40-030(b)(4) require motorists to provide their drivers' licenses in response to a request by law enforcement. However, CPD policy S04-13-09 V (B) provides that a failure to do so is not in and of itself ground for further detention.

⁴⁸ Att.36, S04-13-09(II)(C)

⁴⁹ Att. 36, S04-13-09(II)(C).

⁵⁰ Att. 36, S04-13-09(II)(B).

⁵¹ *United States v. Brown*, 188 F.3d 860, 865 (7th Cir. 1999).

⁵² S04-13-09, at subsection II.C.2; state law provides that the officer must reasonably suspect that "he or another is in danger of attack." 725 ILCS 5/108-1.10.

The ISR states that ██████ gave Officer Legorreta permission to retrieve his identification from his front pocket. This is not supported by the body-worn camera (BWC) footage, which depicts Officer Legorreta reaching into ██████ front left pocket without requesting or receiving verbal consent.⁵³ ██████ later told COPA that the officer just went inside his pocket and removed his ID.⁵⁴ ██████ front left pocket contained keys, identification and bank cards. There was nothing consistent with the shape or presence of a weapon and no other evidence from which a reasonable officer would have concluded that ██████ was armed and dangerous or otherwise presented any danger of attack. As such, COPA sustains this allegation against Officer Legorreta.

D. Searching ██████ vehicle

In conducting a traffic stop, if the police have a reasonable suspicion based on specific and articulable facts to believe that a vehicle occupant may be armed and dangerous, they may not only conduct a protective search for weapon of the person, but also of the passenger compartment of the automobile.⁵⁵ “[T]he search of the passenger compartment of an automobile, [is] limited to those areas in which a weapon may be placed or hidden,” and includes containers such as bags within the automobile⁵⁶ and the trunk if it is accessible from the passenger compartment.⁵⁷

Although Officer Legorreta stated that ██████ vehicle was searched due to ██████ behavior, BWC footage shows ██████ remained calm throughout the encounter. This was corroborated by Officer Ortiz during his interview with COPA.⁵⁸ Additionally, ██████ complied without resistance when asked to exit his vehicle. While COPA considered the characterization of the neighborhood as “high crime area” and ██████ initial failure to provide his driver’s license, as with the analysis regarding the search of ██████ person, above, these factors do not establish reasonable articulable suspicion that ██████ was armed and dangerous. There was no other evidence to lead a reasonable officer to conclude that ██████ was armed and dangerous or posed any sort of a threat.

Therefore, based on the preponderance of the evidence, COPA sustains this allegation against Officer Legorreta.

VI. DISCIPLINARY RECOMMENDATION

a. Officer Fidel Legorreta

i. Complimentary and Disciplinary History⁵⁹

⁵³ This discrepancy in the officer’s report is the basis for COPA’s finding that the officer’s misconduct relating to the search also includes a violation of Rule 10.

⁵⁴ Att. 9, pg. 11, Ins. 3 to 20.

⁵⁵ *Michigan v. Long*, 463 U.S. 1032, 1048-49 (1983).

⁵⁶ *Michigan v. Long*, 463 U.S. at 1049, 105--51.

⁵⁷ *United States v. Arnold*, 388 F. 3d 237, 240 (7th Cir. 2004).

⁵⁸ Att. 32, pg. 15, Ins. 10 to 11.

⁵⁹ Ats. 39, 41.

Officer Legorreta was appointed to CPD on September 27, 2018. Since then, he has received 108 awards, including one honorable mention ribbon award, one life saving award, one top gun arrest award, one complimentary letter, one department commendation award, and 98 honorable mention certificates. He has five instances of recent sustained discipline:

- A one day suspension arising out of a civil rights violation/improper stop and seizure of a vehicle (2023-0000982);⁶⁰
- A five-day suspension arising out of a civil rights violation/improper search of a person/protective pat down (2023-0001905);⁶¹
- A Reprimand arising from a neglect of duty (2023-0002227);⁶²
- A violation noted arising out of a failure to notify OEMC of a vehicular pursuit (2023-0005622); and
- A two-day suspension arising out of a sustained allegation of verbal abuse/use of profanity (2024-0003221).⁶³

He also received two summary punishment infractions, both in 2024, each resulting in a one-day suspension (572878 – preventable accident and 576462 – uniform violation).

ii. Recommended Discipline

In this case, Officer Legorreta violated Rules 2, 3, 6, and 10 by detaining [REDACTED] and searching him and his vehicle without justification. Although Officer Legorreta was justified in directing [REDACTED] to move his vehicle out of the way and [REDACTED] failed to do so, the overall tenor of Officer Legorreta's interaction with [REDACTED] became retaliatory in nature. These combined circumstances, especially if the officer's behavior continues to be repeated numerous times over the course of other interactions with members of the public, have the potential to undermine trust between CPD and members of the public. Additional aggravating factors include the officer's failure to accept responsibility for his actions and that this incident exposed CPD to civil liability. In mitigation, COPA notes Officer Legorreta's complimentary history. For these reasons, and based on the principles of progressive discipline, COPA recommends Officer Legorreta be **suspended for a period of 11 to 29 days** and retraining on CPD's policies regarding the Fourth Amendment (traffic stops, pat downs, and vehicle searches) and professionalism.


⁶⁰ The facts and officer misconduct in that case contain significant parallels to the facts here.

⁶¹ The facts and officer misconduct in that case contain significant parallels to the facts here.

⁶² This was also a traffic stop case with similar circumstances, but the only sustained allegation of misconduct in that case was with respect to a failure to appropriately document the stop.

⁶³ COPA notes Officer Legorreta received sustained allegations for excessive force, temporarily taking a cellphone from a bystander, and verbal abuse in Log 2023-0002469, which COPA closed not long before this incident occurred. CPD agreed with these findings and imposed a 15-day suspension. However, this case is subject to the grievance process and has not yet been finalized.

Approved:



Shannon Hayes
Deputy Chief Administrator

May 29, 2026

Date

Appendix A**Case Details**

Date/Time/Location of Incident:	December 6, 2024 / 3:17 am / 420 N. Leclaire Avenue, Chicago, IL 60644
Date/Time of COPA Notification:	December 6, 2024 / 9:15 am
Involved Member #1:	Fidel Legorreta, Star #5902, Employee ID# [REDACTED] DOA: September 27, 2018, Unit of Assignment: 025, Male, Hispanic
Involved Member #2:	Juan Ortiz Jr., Star #11857, Employee ID# [REDACTED] DOA: July 16, 2024, Unit of Assignment: 015, Male Hispanic
Involved Individual #1:	[REDACTED] Male, Black

Applicable Rules

- ☒ **Rule 2:** Any action or conduct which impedes the Department's efforts to achieve its policy and goals or brings discredit upon the Department.
- ☒ **Rule 3:** Any failure to promote the Department's efforts to implement its policy or accomplish its goals.
- ☐ **Rule 5:** Failure to perform any duty.
- ☒ **Rule 6:** Disobedience of an order or directive, whether written or oral.
- ☐ **Rule 8:** Disrespect to or maltreatment of any person, while on or off duty.
- ☐ **Rule 9:** Engaging in any unjustified verbal or physical altercation with any person, while on or off duty.
- ☒ **Rule 10:** Inattention to duty.
- ☐ **Rule 14:** Making a false report, written or oral.
- ☐ **Rule 38:** Unlawful or unnecessary use or display of a weapon.

Applicable Policies and Laws

- U.S. Const. amend. IV
- 625 ILCS 11-203, Obedience to police officers
- 625 ILCS 11-907, Operation of vehicles and streetcars on approach of authorized emergency vehicles
- 720 ILCS 5/31-4.5, Obstructing identification
- G08-05, Prohibition of Retaliation (Effective August 23, 2023)
- S04-13-09: Investigatory Stop System (Effective July 10, 2017)

Appendix B

Definition of COPA's Findings and Standards of Proof

For each Allegation, COPA must make one of the following findings:

1. Sustained – where it is determined the allegation is supported by a preponderance of the evidence;
2. Not Sustained – where it is determined there is insufficient evidence to prove the allegations by a preponderance of the evidence;
3. Unfounded – where it is determined by clear and convincing evidence that an allegation is false or not factual; or
4. Exonerated – where it is determined by clear and convincing evidence that the conduct described in the allegation occurred, but it is lawful and proper.

A **preponderance of evidence** can be described as evidence indicating that it is **more likely than not** that a proposition is proved.⁶⁴ For example, if the evidence gathered in an investigation establishes that it is more likely that the conduct complied with CPD policy than that it did not, even if by a narrow margin, then the preponderance of the evidence standard is met.

Clear and convincing evidence is a higher standard than a preponderance of the evidence but lower than the “beyond-a-reasonable doubt” standard required to convict a person of a criminal offense. Clear and convincing can be defined as a “degree of proof, which, considering all the evidence in the case, produces the firm and abiding belief that it is highly probable that the proposition . . . is true.”⁶⁵

⁶⁴ See *Avery v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.*, 216 Ill. 2d 100, 191 (2005) (a proposition is proved by a preponderance of the evidence when it is found to be more probably true than not).

⁶⁵ *People v. Coan*, 2016 IL App (2d) 151036, ¶ 28 (quoting Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions, Criminal, No. 4.19 (4th ed. 2000)).

Appendix C

Transparency and Publication Categories

Check all that apply:

- ☐ Abuse of Authority
- ☐ Body Worn Camera Violation
- ☐ Coercion
- ☐ Death or Serious Bodily Injury in Custody
- ☐ Domestic Violence
- ☐ Excessive Force
- ☐ Failure to Report Misconduct
- ☐ False Statement
- ☐ Firearm Discharge
- ☐ Firearm Discharge – Animal
- ☐ Firearm Discharge – Suicide
- ☐ Firearm Discharge – Unintentional
- ☐ First Amendment
- ☒ Improper Search and Seizure – Fourth Amendment Violation
- ☐ Incidents in Lockup
- ☐ Motor Vehicle Incidents
- ☐ OC Spray Discharge
- ☐ Search Warrants
- ☐ Sexual Misconduct
- ☐ Taser Discharge
- ☐ Unlawful Denial of Access to Counsel
- ☐ Unnecessary Display of a Weapon
- ☐ Use of Deadly Force – other
- ☐ Verbal Abuse
- ☐ Other Investigation