



Log # 2024-0021

FINAL SUMMARY REPORT¹

I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

On January 2, 2024, the Civilian Office of Police Accountability (COPA) received an initiation report² from Lieutenant Michelle Wilson³ reporting alleged misconduct by a member of the Chicago Police Department (CPD). Lt. Wilson alleged that on January 2, 2024, Sergeant Camelia Pringle coerced [REDACTED] to sign a consent to search form, so that the officers could search a portion of the apartment in which [REDACTED] entered.⁴ Upon review of the evidence, COPA served additional allegations that Sgt. Pringle failed to activate her body-worn camera in a timely manner, pointed her gun at [REDACTED] without justification, searched the apartment without justification and failed to complete a Tactical Response Report (TRR). Following its investigation, COPA reached sustained findings regarding the search and the failure to activate their body-worn camera in a timely manner.

II. SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE⁵

On January 2, 2024, Sgt. Pringle was assisting Beat 0240 in attempting to find a person with a gun at around [REDACTED].⁶ Sgt. Pringle, while in her police vehicle, observed [REDACTED] with a gun in his hands.⁷ At approximately 12:57 pm, Sgt. Pringle parked in an alley and then pursued [REDACTED] on foot.⁸ Sgt. Pringle entered the backyard of a multi-story building and observed [REDACTED] scaling a fence.⁹ Sgt. Pringle then backtracked to the alley and continued pursuing [REDACTED] who was running down the alley.¹⁰ Following [REDACTED] path, Sgt. Pringle took a left turn on a street and then took another left turn on Michigan Ave.¹¹ Approximately twenty feet ahead of her, Sgt. Pringle observed [REDACTED] crouched on the sidewalk next to a fence.¹²

¹ Appendix A includes case identifiers such as the date, time, and location of the incident, the involved parties and their demographics, and the applicable rules and policies.

² Att. 10 Initiation Report 2024-0021.

³ Att. 2, Lt. Wilson PAR form. Lt. Wilson resigned from the Chicago Police Department on September 12, 2024.

⁴ One or more of these allegations fall within COPA's jurisdiction pursuant to Chicago Municipal Code § 2-78-120. Therefore, COPA determined it would be the primary investigative agency in this matter.

⁵ The following is a summary of what COPA finds most likely occurred during this incident. This summary utilized information from several different sources, including BWC footage, police reports, and CPD member interviews.

⁶ Att. 1 [REDACTED] Arrest Report, Pg. 2.

⁷ Att. 1 [REDACTED] Arrest Report, Pg. 2; Att. 3, Sgt. Pringle's BWC at 0:00 to 0:15; Att. 25, pg. 9, lns. 4 to 5.

⁸ Att. 3 at 1:20 to 1:45.

⁹ Att.3 at 1:45 to 1:55.

¹⁰ Att. 3 at 1:55 to 2:17.

¹¹ Att. 3 at 2:17 to 2:36.

¹² Att. 3 at 2:36.

██████████ then started running again down the sidewalk and Sgt. Pringle pointed her gun at him two times.¹³ Sgt. Pringle then said something to the effect of “he dropped the gun and picked it up spot [sic].”¹⁴ After about thirty seconds of running, Sgt. Pringle observed ██████████ now in front of ██████████, attempting to open the building’s front door.¹⁵ Sgt. Pringle made an effort to detain ██████████ but ██████████ was able to break free from her.¹⁶ ██████████ appeared in front of the open front door while ██████████ fell to his knees in front of ██████████¹⁷ ██████████ crawled inside the building while Sgt. Pringle tried to grab him.¹⁸ However, ██████████ blocked Sgt. Pringle’s attempt at detaining ██████████ by grabbing Sgt. Pringle’s arm and pulling it off ██████████¹⁹ Sgt. Pringle entered the foyer of this building and found ██████████ standing in the open doorway of an apartment.²⁰ Sgt. Pringle grabbed ██████████ and then ██████████ got in between them, thwarting Sgt. Pringle’s attempt to detain ██████████ for the second time by putting hands on Sgt. Pringle.²¹ ██████████ then disappeared inside the apartment.²² Sgt. Pringle radioed in the address of the apartment after asking and receiving the address from ██████████²³

Sgt. Pringle then saw ██████████ down the hallway of the apartment.²⁴ ██████████ handed Sgt. Pringle her ID and then Sgt. Pringle asked ██████████ where he put his gun.²⁵ ██████████ replied that there “ain’t no gun.”²⁶

Sgt. Pringle entered the apartment and walked down the hallway in ██████████ direction. Sgt. Pringle then handcuffed ██████████ behind his back.²⁷ Additional officers appeared in the apartment and Sgt. Pringle handed ██████████ off to those officers and told them that ██████████ had put the gun somewhere in the apartment.²⁸

Soon after, ██████████ was detained and handcuffed by Sgt. Pringle with the assistance of another officer. Sgt. Pringle told ██████████ that she was handcuffed because she interfered when Sgt. Pringle apprehended ██████████²⁹

¹³ Att. 3 at 2:36 to 2:41.

¹⁴ Att. 3 at 2:40 to 2:42.

¹⁵ Att. 3 at 2:40 to 3:09.

¹⁶ Att. 3 at 3:09 to 3:12.

¹⁷ Att. 3 at 3:12 to 3:13.

¹⁸ Att. 3 at 3:13 to 3:15.

¹⁹ Att. 3 at 3:15 to 3:17.

²⁰ Att. 3 at 3:17 to 3:32.

²¹ Att. 3 at 3:32 to 3:44.

²² Att. 3 at 3:44 to 3:46.

²³ Att. 3 at 3:46 to 3:56.

²⁴ Att. 3 at 4:08.

²⁵ Att. 3 at 4:32 to 4:38.

²⁶ Att. 3 at 4:37 to 4:39.

²⁷ Att. 3 at 4:47 to 4:57.

²⁸ Att. 3 at 5:25 to 5:28.

²⁹ Att. 3 at 8:05 to 8:20.

At approximately 1:11 pm, Sgt. Pringle opened the right-side rear passenger door of a police vehicle.³⁰ [REDACTED] was inside the vehicle and was handcuffed behind her back.³¹ Sgt. Pringle held a Consent to Search form and [REDACTED] State of Illinois ID.³²

Sgt. Pringle asked [REDACTED] whether it was her apartment and [REDACTED] replied that it was her apartment.³³ Later on, Sgt. Pringle said to [REDACTED] words to the effect of “so I want you to work with me [...] so what I’m asking is for your consent to search because the weapon is in your house [...] unless I can work with you, without you getting arrested but if you work with me.”³⁴ [REDACTED] then verbally agreed to the search and Sgt. Pringle asked [REDACTED] to sign the consent to search.³⁵ Sgt. Pringle said that [REDACTED] could get in trouble for interfering with Sgt. Pringle’s investigation. Sgt. Pringle then said, “what I’m trying to do is work with you if you work with me.”³⁶ After the handcuffs were removed, [REDACTED] signed the consent to search.³⁷

Sgt. Pringle told COPA that she had not intended to arrest [REDACTED] and believed she could say those things to [REDACTED] because she had discretion not to arrest [REDACTED]. In addition, she did not intend to arrest [REDACTED].³⁸ Sgt. Pringle’s intent was just to provide [REDACTED] with an Investigatory Stop Receipt.³⁹ Sgt. Pringle said [REDACTED] was only arrested because Lt. Wilson gave her a direct order to arrest [REDACTED].⁴⁰

Lt. Wilson told COPA that she told Sgt. Pringle that she (Lt. Wilson) understood Sgt. Pringle’s statements to [REDACTED] to mean that if [REDACTED] signed the consent to search form, [REDACTED] would not be arrested. Lt. Wilson said that she explained to Sgt. Pringle that those statements to [REDACTED] constituted coercion and that was not permissible.⁴¹ Lt. Wilson also said [REDACTED] had to be arrested.

With respect to the search, Sgt. Pringle walked into the kitchen of [REDACTED] apartment, at the end of the hallway, where [REDACTED] had been earlier.⁴² Sgt. Pringle then indicated to several officers that they could now search the kitchen.⁴³ Sgt. Pringle opened the cabinet beneath a sink and removed a lid from an appliance that appeared to be a slow cooker.⁴⁴ Sgt. Pringle then opened

³⁰ Att. 3 at 15:25 to 15:27.

³¹ Att.3 at 15:30 to 15:32.

³² Att.3 at 15:32.

³³ Att.3 at 15:33 to 15:35.

³⁴ Att.3 at 17:05 to 17:34.

³⁵ Att.3 at 17:40 to 17:44.

³⁶ Att.3 at 17:57 to 18:04.

³⁷ Att.3 at 19:18 to 19:23 and 20:14 to 20:19.

³⁸ Att. 25, pg. 21, lns. 17 to 22.

³⁹ Att. 25, pg. 22, lns. 1 to 2.

⁴⁰ Att. 25, pg. 22, lns. 4 to 6.

⁴¹ Att. 17, Lt. Wilson statement transcription, pg. 8, lns. 8 to 11.

⁴² Att.3 at 21:27 to 21:32.

⁴³ Att.3 at 21:36 to 21:42.

⁴⁴ Att.3 at 22:12 to 22:27.

a stove door and a cooking appliance.⁴⁵ Sgt. Pringle then opened the doors of the refrigerator and freezer.⁴⁶ No firearm was discovered during this search.⁴⁷

██████████ and ██████████ were both arrested and transported to the 2nd district for processing.⁴⁸

III. ALLEGATIONS

Sgt. Camelia Pringle:

1. Coerced ██████████ to sign a consent to search form
 - Not Sustained
2. Failed to activate their body-worn camera in a timely manner
 - Sustained, Violations of Rules 2, 3, 5, 6, and 10
3. Pointed their gun at ██████████ without justification
 - Exonerated
4. Searched an apartment without justification
 - Sustained, Violations of Rules 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, and 10
5. Failed to complete a Tactical Response Report (TRR)
 - Exonerated

IV. CREDIBILITY ASSESSMENT

The credibility of an individual relies primarily on two factors: 1) the individual's truthfulness and 2) the reliability of the individual's account. The first factor addresses the honesty of the individual making the statement, while the second factor speaks to the individual's ability to accurately perceive the event at the time of the incident and then accurately recall the event from memory.

Lt. Wilson's account appears to be credible. Her recollection of her conversation with Sgt. Pringle was internally consistent. Additionally, her account of Sgt. Pringle's conversation with ██████████ appears to be similar to the actual conversation between Sgt. Pringle and ██████████ in Sgt. Pringle's BWC footage.

COPA finds also Sgt. Pringle's account to be basically credible, although her statement to COPA could be construed as contradictory to the statements heard on her BWC. Sgt. Pringle told COPA that she did not tell ██████████ that she would not be arrested if she signed the consent to

⁴⁵ Att.3 at 22:47 to 22:58.

⁴⁶ Att.3 at 24:50 to 25:15.

⁴⁷ Att. 1, pg. 2.

⁴⁸ Att. 1, pg. 2 and Att. 2, pg. 2.

search form.⁴⁹ From the BWC footage it appears that Sgt. Pringle did say that to [REDACTED]. However, Sgt. Pringle explained that she did not mean that, because before she received the order to arrest [REDACTED] from Lt. Wilson, Sgt. Pringle intended to let [REDACTED] go and just planned to provide [REDACTED] with an Investigatory Stop Receipt.

V. ANALYSIS⁵⁰

a. Coerced [REDACTED] to sign a consent to search form

COPA finds that Allegation #1, that Sgt. Pringle coerced [REDACTED] to sign a consent to search form is **Not Sustained**. In the BWC footage, Sgt. Pringle said to [REDACTED] words to the effect of “so I want you to work with me [...] so what I’m asking is for your consent to search because the weapon is in your house [...] unless I can work with you, without you getting arrested but if you work with me.”⁵¹ [REDACTED] then verbally agreed to and did sign the consent to search form.⁵²

As discussed above in the Credibility section of this report, Sgt. Pringle told COPA that she did not mean to say that [REDACTED] would not be arrested if she signed the consent to search form. Sgt. Pringle explained that she only intended to provide [REDACTED] with an Investigatory Stop Receipt, and she had not intended to arrest her.⁵³

Pursuant to the Chicago Municipal Code establishing COPA, coercion is defined as “the use of improper or unlawful force or threats, express or implied, in order to compel a person to act against her or her will.”⁵⁴ While Sgt. Pringle’s statement to [REDACTED] as captured on BWC can be construed as a promise, Sgt. Pringle did not use any improper or unlawful force or threats to compel [REDACTED] to sign the form. Therefore, Sgt. Pringle’s comments likely did not rise to coercion, by definition, when getting [REDACTED] to sign the form. In fact, case law appears to indicate that officers can in certain circumstances make statements similar to Sgt. Pringle’s statement, when they have the actual authority to take the action suggested.⁵⁵ Here, because Sgt. Pringle had the authority to use her discretion and not arrest [REDACTED] her specific words may not rise to coercion, based on the preponderance of the evidence. Accordingly, this allegation is **Not Sustained**.

⁴⁹ Att. 25, pg. 19, lns. 12 to 15.

⁵⁰ For a definition of COPA’s findings and standards of proof, see Appendix B.

⁵¹ Att. 3 at 17:05 to 17:34.

⁵² Att. 3 at 17:40 to 17:44; Att. 22, Signed consent to search form.

⁵³ Att. 25, pg. 19, lns. 7 to 15.

⁵⁴ § 2-78-100 of the Chicago Municipal Code.

⁵⁵ See *People v. Kratovil*, 351 Ill. App. 3d 1023, 1031 (2d Dist. 2004). “If a police officer has actual grounds to carry out a course of conduct, communicating his intent amounts to no more than informing a defendant of his legal status and does not vitiate consent.” In *Kratovil*, the court stated that an officer could ask an individual to sign a consent to search form, because if the individual did not sign the form, the officers would seek to obtain a warrant to search the premises. *Kratovil*, 351 Ill. App. 3d at 1031. The court explained that was not coercion because the officer only told the individual what he had the authority to do.

b. Sgt. Pringle failed to activate her body-worn camera in a timely manner

COPA finds that Allegation #2 that Sgt. Pringle failed to activate their body-worn camera in a timely manner is **Sustained**. CPD policy requires CPD members to activate their BWCs for law enforcement-related activities.⁵⁶ The BWC shows that Sgt. Pringle was pursuing ██████ on foot for at least fifteen seconds before activating her BWC.⁵⁷ In her statement, Sgt. Pringle stated that “I would say that I started it (the BWC) when I realized it and it was safe for me to -- and feasible for me to start it.”⁵⁸ Upon viewing of the BWC, there appears to be no reason why it would have been unsafe for Sgt. Pringle to start the BWC at the beginning of this foot pursuit.⁵⁹ As the BWC footage shows, Sgt. Pringle was late activating her BWC at the start of this law enforcement incident, and thus this allegation is Sustained in violation of CPD Rules 5 and 10.

c. Sgt. Pringle pointed her gun at ██████ without justification.

COPA finds that Allegation #3 that Sgt. Pringle pointed their gun at ██████ without justification is **Exonerated**. According to the CPD policy, CPD members “may only point a firearm at a person when it is objectively reasonable to do so under the totality of the circumstances faced by the member on the scene.”⁶⁰ Sgt. Pringle told COPA that she pointed the gun at ██████ for multiple safety reasons. First, Sgt. Pringle stated that she was chasing a man with a weapon that she had seen in his hand. In addition, she was by herself. Furthermore, ██████ was bigger than Sgt. Pringle. Sgt. Pringle said that she knew ██████ was carrying a weapon and she did not know what he would do with it, particularly since she had no backup.⁶¹ COPA finds that based on the totality of the circumstances, it was reasonable for Sgt. Pringle to point her gun at ██████⁶² Accordingly, this allegation is Exonerated.

d. Sgt. Pringle searched an apartment without justification

COPA finds that Allegation #4, that Sgt. Pringle searched an apartment without justification is **Sustained**. As discussed above, Sgt. Pringle likely did not coerce ██████ to sign the consent to search form. However, Sgt. Pringle did not have valid consent to search form. On CPD’s Consent to Search form, the paragraph just above the signature on the Consent to Search form, signature states, “By my signature on this document, I hereby state and certify that this consent to search is being given by me to the above named officers knowingly, voluntarily, and

⁵⁶ Att. 27, S03-14(II), Body Worn Cameras (effective December 29, 2023 to August 8, 2024).

⁵⁷ Att. 3 at 1:45 to 2:00.

⁵⁸ Att. 25, pg. 32, lns. 18 to 20.

⁵⁹ Att. 3 at 1:45 to 2:00.

⁶⁰ Att. 29, D19-01(II)(E), Firearm Pointing Incidents (Effective November 1, 2019 to Present). Note: As of April 15, 2025, this directive has been rescinded and replaced with Att. 32, S03-22, Firearm Pointing Incidents (effective April 15, 2025 to present).

⁶¹ Att. 25, pg. 16, lns. 4 to 9.

⁶² Att. 29, D19-01(II)(E).

without having received any threats, promises, or duress of any kind.”⁶³ Because Sgt. Pringle’s words to ██████ can be construed as a promise, the signed consent to search form was not valid.

Under certain circumstances in situations like the incident here, Sgt. Pringle could have searched the area where ██████ had gone with the gun as a search incident to ██████ arrest. Nevertheless, those circumstances were not present here. A search incident to arrest can be conducted in a situation such as this if it could be justified by either the interest in officer safety or in the interest in preserving evidence.⁶⁴ Searches incident to arrest permit officers to search the individual and the area within the individual’s “immediate control” from which he may obtain a weapon or destroy evidence.⁶⁵ Searches incident to arrest are reasonable “in order to remove any weapons the individual might seek to use” and “to prevent the concealment or destruction” of evidence.⁶⁶ However, once the individual is arrested, and the individual no longer has access to the area, the reason for a search of the area incident to arrest no longer exists. When Sgt. Pringle conducted the search of the kitchen area, ██████ had already been arrested, and thus, the area was no longer under his immediate control. Because Sgt. Pringle had no other reason to search inside the apartment’s cabinets and other interior spaces, the search was improper. Therefore, this allegation is sustained in violation of CPD Rules 1, 2, 3, 6, and 8.

e. Sgt. Pringle failed to complete a Tactical Response Report (TRR).

COPA finds that Allegation #5, that Sgt. Pringle failed to complete a Tactical Response Report (TRR) is **Exonerated**. CPD policy requires CPD members to complete a TRR following certain use of force incidents.⁶⁷ Sgt. Pringle did complete a TRR in connection with the use of force with ██████⁶⁸ While Sgt. Pringle did not complete a TRR with respect to ██████ a TRR was not necessary for ██████ There is no need for a TRR when a person’s only action of resisting was fleeing, the member’s use of force did not extend beyond verbal command or control holds, and the person was not injured and did not complain of injury.⁶⁹ Because ██████ only action in resisting was fleeing, Sgt. Pringle’s use of force did not extend beyond verbal commands, and ██████ was not injured and did not complain of injury a TRR was not required for Sgt. Pringle’s interaction with to ██████ Accordingly, this allegation is exonerated.

VI. DISCIPLINARY RECOMMENDATION

a. Sgt. Camelia Pringle

⁶³ Att. 22.

⁶⁴ *Arizona v. Gant*, 556 U.S. 332, 339 (2009).

⁶⁵ *People v. James*, 2021 IL App (1st) 180509, ¶21.

⁶⁶ *Arizona v. Gant*, 556 U.S. at 339.

⁶⁷ Att. 28, G03-02-02(III)(A), Incidents Requiring the Completion of a Tactical Response Report (effective June 28, 2023 to Present).

⁶⁸ Att. 12, Sgt. Pringle’s TRR for ██████

⁶⁹ Att. 28, G03-02-02(III)(A)(1).

i. Complimentary and Disciplinary History⁷⁰

Sgt. Pringle has been a member of CPD for almost nine years at the time this incident occurred. She has received 76 various awards, including 60 Honorable Mention Certificates, one Honorable Mention Ribbon Award, and one Police Officer of the Month Award. Sgt. Pringle has no finalized sustained disciplinary history in the past five years.

ii. Recommended Discipline

COPA has found that Sgt. Pringle violated Rules 2, 3, 5, 6, 8, and 10 when she appeared to promise ██████ that she would not be arrested if she signed the consent to search form, searched the apartment without a warrant or proper consent, and failed to timely activate her BWC. However, Sgt. Pringle believed she did not coerce ██████ to sign the consent to search form, because Sgt. Pringle believed she had the discretion to decide not to arrest ██████. Furthermore, Sgt. Pringle activated her BWC relatively early on during the incident. Based on Sgt. Pringle's complimentary history and lack of disciplinary history, COPA recommends Sgt. Pringle receive a **1-to-29-day suspension** and **retraining** on obtaining consent to search.

Approved:



Angela Hearts Glass
Deputy Chief Administrator – Chief Investigator

June 16, 2025

Date

⁷⁰ Attachment 31.

Appendix A**Case Details**

Date/Time/Location of Incident:	January 2, 2024 / ██████████, Chicago, IL 60653
Date/Time of COPA Notification:	January 2, 2024 / 3:14 pm
Involved Member #1:	Sgt. Camelia Pringle / Star#1933 / Employee#████████ / Date of Appointment: February 2, 2015 / Unit of Assignment: 02 / Female / Black
Involved Individual #1:	██████████ Female, Black
Involved Individual #2:	██████████ Male, Black

Applicable Rules

- Rule 2:** Any action or conduct which impedes the Department's efforts to achieve its policy and goals or brings discredit upon the Department.
- Rule 3:** Any failure to promote the Department's efforts to implement its policy or accomplish its goals.
- Rule 5:** Failure to perform any duty.
- Rule 6:** Disobedience of an order or directive, whether written or oral.
- Rule 8:** Disrespect to or maltreatment of any person, while on or off duty.
- Rule 9:** Engaging in any unjustified verbal or physical altercation with any person, while on or off duty.
- Rule 10:** Inattention to duty.
- Rule 14:** Making a false report, written or oral.
- Rule 38:** Unlawful or unnecessary use or display of a weapon.
- Rule 1:** Violation of any law or ordinance

Applicable Policies and Laws

- *Bumper v. North Carolina*, 391 U.S. 543 (1968).
- *People v. Kratovil*, 351 Ill. App. 3d 1023 (2d Dist. 2004).
- *United States v. Santana*, 427 U.S. 38 (1976).
- *Arizona v. Gant*, 556 U.S. 332 (2009).
- D19-01, Firearm Pointing Incidents (effective November 1, 2019 to April 15, 2025).
- S03-14, Body Worn Cameras (effective December 29, 2023 to August 8, 2024).
- G03-02-02, Incidents Requiring the Completion of a Tactical Response Report (effective June 28, 2023 to Present).

Appendix B

Definition of COPA's Findings and Standards of Proof

For each Allegation, COPA must make one of the following findings:

1. Sustained – where it is determined the allegation is supported by a preponderance of the evidence;
2. Not Sustained – where it is determined there is insufficient evidence to prove the allegations by a preponderance of the evidence;
3. Unfounded – where it is determined by clear and convincing evidence that an allegation is false or not factual; or
4. Exonerated – where it is determined by clear and convincing evidence that the conduct described in the allegation occurred, but it is lawful and proper.

A **preponderance of evidence** can be described as evidence indicating that it is **more likely than not** that a proposition is proved.⁷¹ For example, if the evidence gathered in an investigation establishes that it is more likely that the conduct complied with CPD policy than that it did not, even if by a narrow margin, then the preponderance of the evidence standard is met.

Clear and convincing evidence is a higher standard than a preponderance of the evidence but lower than the “beyond-a-reasonable doubt” standard required to convict a person of a criminal offense. Clear and convincing can be defined as a “degree of proof, which, considering all the evidence in the case, produces the firm and abiding belief that it is highly probable that the proposition . . . is true.”⁷²

⁷¹ See *Avery v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.*, 216 Ill. 2d 100, 191 (2005) (a proposition is proved by a preponderance of the evidence when it is found to be more probably true than not).

⁷² *People v. Coan*, 2016 IL App (2d) 151036, ¶ 28 (quoting Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions, Criminal, No. 4.19 (4th ed. 2000)).

Appendix C

Transparency and Publication Categories

Check all that apply:

- Abuse of Authority
- Body Worn Camera Violation
- Coercion
- Death or Serious Bodily Injury in Custody
- Domestic Violence
- Excessive Force
- Failure to Report Misconduct
- False Statement
- Firearm Discharge
- Firearm Discharge – Animal
- Firearm Discharge – Suicide
- Firearm Discharge – Unintentional
- First Amendment
- Improper Search and Seizure – Fourth Amendment Violation
- Incidents in Lockup
- Motor Vehicle Incidents
- OC Spray Discharge
- Search Warrants
- Sexual Misconduct
- Taser Discharge
- Unlawful Denial of Access to Counsel
- Unnecessary Display of a Weapon
- Use of Deadly Force – other
- Verbal Abuse
- Other Investigation