

SUMMARY REPORT OF INVESTIGATION

I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Date of Incident:	June 8, 2019
Time of Incident:	9:19 pm
Location of Incident:	421 N. Pulaski Road, Chicago IL 60624
Date of COPA Notification:	June 8, 2019
Time of COPA Notification:	10:26 pm

On June 8, 2019, at approximately 9:19 pm, three 15th District tactical officers were on patrol in the vicinity of Iowa Street and Lamon Avenue. Officer Lukasz Gorski was driving the officers' unmarked police sport utility vehicle (SUV), while Officer Alexander Kulisek was the front seat passenger, and Officer Zachary Nolfi was the rear seat passenger. The officers observed a group of Conservative Vice Lord (CVL) gang members congregated on the street, including several known associates of ██████████, a 17-year old juvenile. At the time, ██████████ had a warrant for failure to appear in juvenile court related to a probation violation, but the officers believed ██████████ had a warrant for the attempted murder of a sheriff's officer.¹ As the officers spoke to ██████████'s associates, they observed a red Kia Optima disregard a stop sign at Walton Street while traveling southbound on Lavergne Avenue at a high rate of speed. Officer Gorski pulled the police SUV alongside the Kia at a red light at Lavergne Avenue and Chicago Avenue, where both he and Officer Nolfi positively identified the driver as ██████████. When the light changed to green, the Kia turned eastbound onto Chicago Avenue. Officer Gorski activated his emergency equipment and curbed the Kia at approximately 4935 W. Chicago Avenue. As soon as the officers exited their vehicle, the Kia fled from the traffic stop.

The officers reentered their vehicle, and Officer Gorski initiated a vehicle pursuit. As Officer Nolfi radioed information to OEMC, Officer Gorski pursued the Kia eastbound on Chicago Avenue, then southbound on Kostner Avenue into a CTA bus parking lot. The Kia exited the CTA lot at Pulaski Road, where it turned southbound and accelerated to an estimated 80-100 miles per hour (mph). Officer Gorski followed the Kia onto Pulaski Road, but all three officers quickly lost sight of the vehicle. At approximately 600 N. Pulaski Road, Officer Gorski deactivated his emergency equipment and self-terminated the pursuit. The Kia continued to flee southbound on Pulaski Road at a high rate of speed. At approximately 421 N. Pulaski Road, the Kia struck a guard rail, crossed the center line, and caused a head-on collision with a Honda CRV.² The officers observed the aftermath of the collision and stopped to render assistance. ██████████ was pronounced deceased at the scene, and his passenger, ██████████, succumbed to his injuries the following morning. The three occupants of the Honda were injured but survived.

¹ COPA determined ██████████'s warrant was from a juvenile court probation for possession of a stolen motor vehicle (PSMV), which stemmed from an incident in which ██████████ had allegedly driven a stolen vehicle in the direction of a Cook County Sherriff's Deputy.

² Appendix A is a diagram showing the path of the vehicle pursuit and the location of the crash.

COPA’s investigation determined Officer Gorski’s decision to initiate and continue the vehicle pursuit violated Department policy, and allegations #1 and 3 against him are Sustained. Additionally, Officer Nolfi failed to inform OEMC of the specific reason for the pursuit, and in doing so he failed to comply with Department procedures when a pursuit is initiated. For this reason, COPA finds allegation #1 against Officer Nolfi is Sustained. Finally, none of the three officers timely activated their body worn cameras (BWC), and COPA finds those allegations are also Sustained.

II. INVOLVED PARTIES

Involved Officer #1:	GORSKI, Lukasz, Star #6155, Employee ID # [REDACTED], Date of Appointment: February 19, 2013, Police Officer, Unit 015, DOB: [REDACTED], 1985, Male, White
Involved Officer #2:	NOLFI, Zachary, Star #19357, Employee ID # [REDACTED], Date of Appointment: May 1, 2013, Police Officer, Unit 015, DOB: [REDACTED], 1988, Male, White
Involved Officer #3:	KULISEK, Alexander, Star #15054, Employee ID # [REDACTED], Date of Appointment: February 19, 2013, Police Officer, Unit 015, DOB: [REDACTED], 1987, Male, White
Involved Individual #1:	[REDACTED], DOB: [REDACTED], 2002, Male, Black
Involved Individual #2:	[REDACTED], DOB: [REDACTED], 1996, Male, Black

III. ALLEGATIONS

Officer	Allegation	Finding/ Recommendation
Officer Lukasz Gorski #6155	It is alleged that on or about June 8, 2019, at approximately 9:20 pm, in the vicinity of 4935 W. Chicago Avenue, Officer Gorski:	
	1. Initiated a motor vehicle pursuit in violation of General Order G03-03-01.	SUSTAINED/180-days to Separation
	2. Failed to comply with Department procedures when a pursuit is initiated, in violation of General Order G03-03-01(VI)(A).	NOT SUSTAINED
	3. Continued a motor vehicle pursuit in violation of General Order G03-03-01.	SUSTAINED/180-days to Separation
	4. Failed to timely activate his Body Worn Camera, in violation of Special Order S03-14.	SUSTAINED/180-days to Separation

<p>Officer Zachary Nolfi #19357</p>	<p>It is alleged that on or about June 8, 2019, at approximately 9:20 pm, in the vicinity of 4935 W. Chicago Avenue, Officer Nolfi:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Failed to comply with Department procedures when a pursuit is initiated, in violation of General Order G03-03-01(VI)(A). 2. Failed to timely activate his Body Worn Camera, in violation of Special Order S03-14. 	<p>SUSTAINED/ 10-day suspension</p> <p>SUSTAINED/ 10-day suspension</p>
<p>Officer Alexander Kulisek #15054</p>	<p>It is alleged that on or about June 8, 2019, at approximately 9:20 pm, in the vicinity of 4935 W. Chicago Avenue, Officer Kulisek:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Failed to comply with Department procedures when a pursuit is initiated, in violation of General Order G03-03-01(VI)(A). 2. Prematurely deactivated and/or failed to timely activate his Body Worn Camera, in violation of Special Order S03-14. 	<p>NOT SUSTAINED</p> <p>SUSTAINED/ 3-day suspension</p>

IV. APPLICABLE RULES AND LAWS

<p>Rules</p>
<p>1. Rule 6: Disobedience of an order or directive, whether written or oral.</p>
<p>General Orders</p>
<p>1. G03-03-01: Emergency Vehicle Operations – Pursuits (Effective April 9, 2019 - August 14, 2020).</p>
<p>Special Orders</p>
<p>1. S03-14: Body Worn Cameras (Effective April 30, 2018 - present).</p>

V. INVESTIGATION³

a. Interviews

In a **statement to COPA on September 17, 2019, Officer Lukasz Gorski #6155⁴** provided his account of the incident. On the date and time of the incident, Officer Gorski was on

³ COPA conducted a thorough and complete investigation. The following is a summary of the material evidence gathered and relied upon in our analysis.

⁴ Atts. 79, 98.

duty, in civilian dress, and assigned to Beat 1562B. He was operating an unmarked Ford Explorer and his partners, Officers Kulisek and Nolfi, were the passengers. The officers were on directed patrol in the 15th District when Officer Gorski observed a group of CVL gang members congregated near Iowa Street and Lamon Avenue. Officer Gorski recognized at least two of the individuals, [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] [REDACTED]⁵, as associates of [REDACTED], and he knew all three to be members of the CVL gang. Once the officers observed the group, they immediately began looking for [REDACTED]. According to Officer Gorski, it was common knowledge among the 15th District tactical teams that [REDACTED] was wanted for the attempted murder of a Cook County Sheriff's officer, possession of a stolen motor vehicle (PSMV), and robbery. [REDACTED] had eluded police for several months, and Officer Gorski's prior attempts to locate him were unsuccessful. Officer Gorski was certain the warrant was valid on the date of the incident, as "word of mouth spread that he had a warrant. If Mr. [REDACTED] had been arrested, word of mouth would spread, and I would know, because he's somebody that has been eluding us for a while."⁶ However, Officer Gorski stated he would not be aware if the warrant had been quashed in court, or otherwise been disposed of without the involvement of one of the officers he worked with. Officer Gorski stated he had multiple prior interactions with [REDACTED]⁷, was familiar with [REDACTED]'s appearance, and would recognize him on sight.

As Officer Gorski and his partners looked for [REDACTED], Officer Gorski observed a red Kia driving southbound on Lavergne Avenue, at a high rate of speed. The vehicle ran a stop sign at Walton Street, then stopped at the red light at Lavergne Avenue and Chicago Avenue. Officer Gorski immediately suspected [REDACTED] might be in the Kia, and he told his partners, "We got to go see if that's [REDACTED]."⁸ Officer Gorski pulled the police SUV along the passenger's side of the Kia, which was still stopped at the red light. He glanced over and saw only one person inside the Kia—the driver, whom Officer Gorski immediately recognized as [REDACTED]. At the same time, Officer Nolfi stated words to the effect of "that's him,"⁹ leading Officer Gorski to believe Officer Nolfi also identified [REDACTED]. Both vehicles turned eastbound on Chicago Avenue, and Officer Gorski activated his emergency equipment to curb the Kia. It immediately pulled over, but as soon as Officer Gorski opened his door and started to exit the police SUV, the Kia fled the traffic stop. Officer Gorski initiated a vehicle pursuit as Officer Nolfi communicated with OEMC over Zone 12. There was light vehicular traffic and no pedestrian traffic on Chicago Avenue, and [REDACTED] was driving very cautiously. Officer Gorski estimated both vehicles were traveling approximately 35-45 mph, and he stated the Kia did not disregard any traffic signals until it reached Kostner Avenue. The Kia failed to come to a complete stop before it turned right on red at Kostner Avenue. It then drove southbound into the CTA lot, where its speeds were even slower, and there was no vehicular or pedestrian traffic.

Officer Gorski maintained constant visual of the Kia until it exited the CTA lot and proceeded southbound on Pulaski Road. At that point, Officer Gorski estimated the Kia accelerated

⁵ A CLEAR Data Warehouse search confirms [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] were known associates of [REDACTED]. Att. 88. In fact, [REDACTED] was a passenger in the stolen vehicle [REDACTED] was driving when he allegedly attempted to run over a Cook County Sheriff's officer on August 31, 2018. Att. 91.

⁶ Att. 98, pg. 15, lines 19-23.

⁷ Officer Gorski stated he had never previously arrested [REDACTED], but he recalled making numerous street stops and traffic stops involving [REDACTED] when he was younger.

⁸ Att. 98, pg. 24, lines 15-16.

⁹ Att. 98, pg. 24, line 2.

to 100 mph, and he immediately lost sight of it. Officer Gorski decided it was no longer safe to pursue the Kia, and he deactivated his emergency equipment at approximately 600 N. Pulaski Road. As he removed his foot from the gas pedal and veered to the right, he heard Officer Kulisek say there was a crash ahead of them and they should render assistance. Officer Gorski continued to drive southbound on Pulaski Road and saw the aftermath of a traffic crash involving the Kia and an SUV. He stopped and exited the police SUV, then observed there were actually two people inside the Kia, and both were unresponsive. [REDACTED] was lying face down in the driver's seat, and [REDACTED] was lying face up in the passenger's seat. Officer Kulisek or Officer Nolfi immediately requested EMS, and Officer Gorski approached the second vehicle and attempted to comfort its three occupants, one of whom appeared to be badly injured.

Officer Gorski denied allegations #1 and #3. He explained that he did not run a name check on [REDACTED] prior to initiating the pursuit because he was certain [REDACTED] was wanted for attempted murder, and the pursuit was their best opportunity to apprehend him. According to Officer Gorski, [REDACTED] had eluded the police for months, and the officers did not have an address where they could simply knock on the door and arrest him. Officer Gorski did not consider the pursuit to be reckless or dangerous until the Kia accelerated on Pulaski Road, at which point he self-terminated it. Regarding allegation #2, Officer Gorski stated Officer Nolfi made all of the radio transmissions during the pursuit, and he did not go over the air at all. Officer Gorski did not recall hearing Officer Nolfi answer yes when the dispatcher asked if the driver of the Kia was wanted only for a traffic offense, but he acknowledged that was not an accurate statement.

When questioned about allegation #4, Officer Gorski acknowledged he did not activate his BWC until he stopped the police SUV next to the traffic crash. He explained he normally activates his BWC as he is walking up to a vehicle during a traffic stop, but in this situation the Kia fled the traffic stop before he had the opportunity to turn on his camera. Once the Kia took off, Officer Gorski was driving the police SUV, and he did not think about activating his BWC.

In a **statement to COPA on September 3, 2019, Officer Zachary Nolfi #19357¹⁰** stated prior to the incident, he had patrolled the area near Chicago Avenue and Lavergne Avenue (Beat 1531) for over five years. During that time, he watched [REDACTED] and his friends grow up in the area and knew them to be associated with the TNG faction of the CVL gang. Officer Nolfi had casual conversations with [REDACTED] on the street multiple times, and he recognized [REDACTED] on sight. At the time of the incident, Officer Nolfi believed [REDACTED] had an active warrant for attempted murder of a police officer, PSMV, and robbery.¹¹ The charges arose from an incident in which [REDACTED] attempted to run over a Cook County Sheriff's officer with a stolen vehicle. Officer Nolfi had been looking for [REDACTED] for several months, with negative results. He explained, "It's not like you're going to get this kid at his house, knocking on his door, and he's

¹⁰ Atts. 73, 97.

¹¹ Officer Nolfi recalled that he ran a name check on [REDACTED] at some point prior to the date of the incident, though he could not provide a more specific time frame. He stated the results indicated [REDACTED] was wanted for was PSMV, and attempted murder and robbery were listed as "other charges" on the bottom of the warrant. Officer Nolfi did not know the warrant was only for a probation violation on the PSMV conviction until he was presented with [REDACTED]'s criminal court records during his COPA statement. The discrepancy appears to arise, at least in part, from Officer Nolfi's misreading of the Law Enforcement Agencies Data System (LEADS) results for [REDACTED]. That document specifies that [REDACTED] was wanted for PSMV, then lists previous charges of armed robbery with a firearm and attempted first degree murder. See Att. 60, pg. 305.

going to open the door. It's just not going to happen that way with him."¹² Officer Nolfi could not recall if he had tried to go to ██████'s address, but he said he had looked for him in the general area.

On the date and time of the incident, Officer Nolfi was on duty, in civilian dress, working with Officers Gorski and Kulisek. Officer Gorski was driving their unmarked Ford Explorer; Officer Kulisek was the front seat passenger, and Officer Nolfi was sitting in the rear seat, behind Officer Kulisek. The officers were on directed patrol in beat 1531 due to a conflict between gang factions in the area. As they patrolled, Officer Nolfi observed at least 20 people in the street and on the corner of Lamon Avenue and Iowa Street, including several known members of the same faction of the CVL gang as ██████. Officer Nolfi recognized a group of ██████'s friends, and he exited the police SUV and spoke to two of them, ██████ and ██████.¹³ Officer Nolfi did not see ██████, so he reentered the police SUV and started patrolling the area, looking for ██████. They discussed that ██████ might be in a nearby vehicle, given his history of vehicle-related arrests.

As the officers were traveling westbound on Walton Street or Iowa Street, Officer Nolfi observed the Kia driving southbound on Lavergne at a high rate of speed. It disregarded a stop sign at a speed of at least 30 mph, but stopped at a red light at Chicago Avenue and Lavergne Avenue. One of Officer Nolfi's partners suggested ██████ might be in the Kia, so the officers drove toward the vehicle. Officer Gorski pulled along the passenger's side of the Kia while it was stopped at the red light. Officer Nolfi looked over, saw the driver of the Kia, and immediately recognized him as ██████. He announced to his partners, "That's him."¹⁴ Officer Nolfi did not hear ██████ say anything and did not see ██████ give any facial clues that he recognized the officers as police. Officer Nolfi denied seeing anyone else inside the Kia, but he pointed out that the front passenger's seat was found to be in a fully reclined position after the crash.

When the light turned green, Officer Gorski activated the police SUV's emergency equipment as the Kia turned eastbound on Chicago Avenue. The Kia immediately pulled over, but as soon as Officers Nolfi and Kulisek exited the police SUV, the Kia fled eastbound on Chicago Avenue. The officers got back into their vehicle, and Officer Gorski activated their lights and sirens and initiated a vehicle pursuit. Officer Nolfi stated he agreed with Officer Gorski's decision, as "I thought that he was wanted for the attempt murder of a police officer, which in my eyes is good enough to try to apprehend a subject, you know, without, you know, trying to get anything - - into -- too crazy."¹⁵ Officer Nolfi stated the roads were dry, the weather was clear, there was light vehicular and pedestrian traffic on Chicago Avenue, and the Kia did not disregard any traffic signals until it turned right on red at Kostner Avenue. Additionally, the Kia was not driving erratically or extremely fast, and he estimated the fastest the police SUV was traveling on Chicago Avenue was 45 mph. Officer Nolfi immediately alerted OEMC they initiated a pursuit, and he relayed a description of the Kia, its license plate number, number of occupants, location, speed, and direction of travel. Officer Nolfi acknowledged he did not initially provide the specific reason

¹² Att. 97, pg. 34, lines 15-18.

¹³ A search of CPD records confirms Officer Nolfi had prior documented encounters with ██████, ██████, and ██████. Atts. 87, 89-90.

¹⁴ Att. 97, pg. 29, lines 2-3.

¹⁵ Att. 97, pg. 32, line 22 – pg. 33, line 2.

for the pursuit, and he admitted he erroneously answered yes when the dispatcher asked if the Kia was only wanted for a traffic offense.

When the Kia reached Kostner Avenue, it disregarded a red light and turned southbound into the CTA lot. The police SUV followed three to four car lengths behind the Kia. Officer Nolfi stated there were no vehicles between them, and there was no vehicular or pedestrian traffic in the CTA lot. Officer Nolfi believed the CTA lot was a dead end, and the vehicle pursuit would turn into a foot pursuit, but unbeknownst to him, there was an exit at Pulaski Road. The Kia turned southbound onto Pulaski Road and immediately took off “like a bat out of hell.”¹⁶ Officer Nolfi lost sight of the Kia as the police SUV turned onto Pulaski Road, and Officer Gorski deactivated the emergency equipment and self-terminated the pursuit near Ohio. They did not have any communication with a supervisor during the pursuit, which lasted approximately two minutes.

As Officer Gorski started to slow down, Officer Kulisek stated he thought there was a crash ahead of them. Officer Nolfi did not see or hear the collision, but he realized it involved the Kia when the officers drove toward the crash site. Officer Nolfi observed a severely damaged silver SUV facing northbound on Pulaski Road and the Kia facing southeast on Pulaski Road, missing its roof. Officer Nolfi exited the police SUV and approached the Kia, at which point he saw both front seats were fully reclined. [REDACTED] was lying face down in the driver’s seat and appeared to be unconscious. A second male was lying face up in the passenger’s seat, taking shallow breaths. Officer Nolfi requested EMS and stayed with the Kia. Officer Nolfi did not have any interaction with the three occupants of the SUV.

Officer Nolfi did not deny allegation #1. He acknowledged he mistakenly responded yes when the dispatcher asked if the Kia was only wanted for a traffic offense. Officer Nolfi explained he was about to say “Yeah, it was traffic, but also...,”¹⁷ when he observed the smoke from the traffic crash. At that point, Officer Nolfi became distracted by the conversation inside the police SUV, and he did not correct his inaccurate transmission. Once the officers arrived at the crash site, Officer Nolfi stated he was focused on getting ambulances for all of the victims, including [REDACTED] and [REDACTED]. He forgot to go over the air and explain the actual reason for the pursuit, which was that the driver of the Kia was wanted for the attempted murder of a police officer.¹⁸

Officer Nolfi acknowledged he did not activate his BWC until he exited the police SUV after the collision. He explained that under normal circumstances, he would have activated his camera as he was approaching the Kia at the traffic stop on Chicago Avenue. However, in this situation, the Kia fled before Officer Nolfi activated his camera, and he forgot to activate it during the pursuit.

In a **statement to COPA on September 17, 2019, Officer Alexander Kulisek #15054**¹⁹ stated prior to the incident, he worked in the area near Iowa Street and Lamon Avenue for

¹⁶ Att. 97, pg. 22, lines 1-2.

¹⁷ Att. 97, pg. 37, line 1.

¹⁸ Officer Nolfi acknowledged he did not attempt to verify [REDACTED]’s warrant prior to the vehicle pursuit. He explained, “I knew he had an active warrant so I didn’t think there was a need to run his name again, you know, when we saw him.” Att. 97, pg. 48, lines 22-24.

¹⁹ Atts. 80, 100.

approximately five years and knew it to be associated with the TNG faction of the CVL gang. ██████ was a member of the gang who was wanted for the attempted murder of a police officer following an incident in which ██████ attempted to run over a Cook County Sheriff's officer with a stolen vehicle. Officer Kulisek learned of ██████'s warrant via word of mouth from other officers, and he stated it was common knowledge within his tactical team. Officer Kulisek estimated he had known that ██████ was wanted for attempted murder for weeks, if not longer. He could not recall if he had any prior encounters with ██████, but it was a strong possibility.

On the date and time of the incident, Officer Kulisek was on duty, in civilian dress, and working with Officers Gorski and Nolfi. Officer Gorski was driving their unmarked Ford Explorer, while Officer Kulisek was the front seat passenger, and Officer Nolfi was the rear seat passenger, behind the driver. The officers were near Lamon Avenue and Iowa Street when Officer Kulisek observed 10 to 15 individuals walking on the street and sidewalk, some of whom he recognized to be associated with the CVL gang. The officers stopped to see if ██████ was in the crowd, but neither Officer Nolfi nor Officer Gorski saw him. Officer Kulisek stated he relied on his partners to identify ██████, as both had prior encounters with him and could recognize him on sight. When the officers did not see ██████ in the crowd, they decided to patrol the area looking for him. Officer Kulisek thought it unlikely ██████ would be walking on the street due to his arrest warrant. He told his partners ██████ might be in a vehicle, as he had prior arrests for PSMV and a history of fleeing in vehicles. As the officers began looking in parked cars, Officer Kulisek observed a red Kia driving southbound on Lavergne Avenue at a high rate of speed. The Kia disregarded the stop sign at Walton Street, and Officer Kulisek suspected that ██████ might be inside the vehicle. When the Kia stopped at a red light at Chicago Avenue and Lavergne Avenue, Officer Gorski pulled along the passenger's side of the Kia. Officer Kulisek did not get a good look at the driver of the Kia, but he heard Officer Nolfi announce, "That's him. That's ██████."²⁰

When the light turned green, the Kia turned eastbound on Chicago Ave, followed by the police SUV. Officer Gorski activated their emergency equipment and curbed the Kia, but as soon as Officer Kulisek exited the police SUV, the Kia drove away from the traffic stop. Officer Kulisek reentered the police SUV and gave Officer Nolfi the Kia's license plate number so he could broadcast it over the radio. Officer Gorski initiated a vehicle pursuit and followed the Kia as it traveled eastbound on Chicago Avenue through two green lights. Officer Kulisek stated he agreed with Officer Gorski's decision to initiate the pursuit, based on the severity of the crime ██████ was wanted for, the light vehicular and pedestrian traffic on Chicago Avenue, and the fact that ██████ was not driving very aggressively or at a high rate of speed. He explained that just because they knew ██████'s identity did not mean they would be able to apprehend him at a later date, as ██████ had eluded the police for weeks.

Officer Kulisek had a continuous visual of the Kia on Chicago Avenue, where it was approximately a half-block to a block in front of the police SUV. He estimated the Kia was traveling 40-60 mph on Chicago Avenue, and the police SUV followed at speeds of 30-50 mph. When the Kia reached Kostner Avenue, it turned right on red and entered the CTA lot, where there was no pedestrian traffic and minimal vehicular traffic. Officer Kulisek believed the CTA lot was a dead end, and the officers would be able to apprehend ██████ when he attempted to flee on foot. The Kia slowed down to less than 30 mph, until ██████ located a second exit and turned

²⁰ Att. 100, pg. 19, lines 2-3.

southbound onto Pulaski Road. At that point, Officer Kulisek estimated the Kia accelerated to more than 80 mph and he quickly lost sight of it. The officers discussed that [REDACTED] was “way far ahead. He’s driving crazy now. Let it go.”²¹ Officer Gorski made the decision to self-terminate the pursuit and deactivated their emergency equipment at approximately 600 N. Pulaski Road.

As Officer Gorski started pulling to the righthand side of the road, Officer Kulisek saw smoke and steam rising in the distance. He alerted his partners there was a car accident ahead, and they drove to the crash site to investigate. Officer Kulisek saw two vehicles involved in the crash, including the Kia. He exited the police SUV and approached the Kia with his weapon drawn, concerned [REDACTED] might attempt to flee on foot. As he got closer, he saw there were two people in the Kia, and neither was responsive. The driver was lying face down with both hands underneath his body. Officer Kulisek immediately called for EMS and maintained a safe distance from the Kia, as he did not know if there was a weapon in the vehicle. He then switched locations with Officer Gorski and rendered medical aid to the occupants of the second vehicle.²²

Officer Kulisek denied allegation #1, stating Officer Nolfi was the primary person communicating with OEMC. Officer Kulisek did not go over the air until the pursuit ended, when he requested EMS. He did not recall if Officer Nolfi provided OEMC with the specific reason for the pursuit, and he denied hearing Officer Nolfi answer yes when the dispatcher asked if the driver of the Kia was wanted only for a traffic offense. However, Officer Kulisek acknowledged Officer Nolfi’s response was not accurate.

When questioned about his BWC, Officer Kulisek stated he initially activated it as he exited the police SUV at the traffic stop on Chicago Avenue. He acknowledged he deactivated his BWC 18 seconds later, but did not recall why. Officer Kulisek stated it was a high-stress situation, and he likely deactivated his BWC out of habit when he reentered the police SUV after the Kia fled the traffic stop. He equated the situation to automatically putting on a seat belt whenever he enters a vehicle. Officer Kulisek did not realize his BWC was not recording until after the collision, at which point he immediately reactivated it.

In a **statement to COPA on June 18, 2019, Officer Nicholas Saviano #4542**²³ stated on the evening of June 8, 2019, he was working overtime on a robbery/burglary team in the 15th District. At approximately 8:06 pm, Officer Saviano and his partner, Officer David Hardt, observed a large crowd of civilians standing on the corner of Lamon Avenue and Iowa Street. Officer Saviano recognized several of the civilians as associates of [REDACTED], whom Officer Saviano recalled was the subject of an investigative alert and possibly an arrest warrant. Officer Saviano did not know the nature of the warrant, but he believed the investigative alert involved a homicide that detectives wanted to speak to [REDACTED] about.²⁴ Officer Saviano did not see [REDACTED] in the crowd, but he knew him to frequent the area. As a result, Officer Saviano ran a name check on [REDACTED] to verify the alert and warrant were still valid, in case he later encountered

²¹ Att. 100, pg. 34, lines 18-19.

²² Officer Kulisek stated he is LEMART trained, which means he has completed the Department’s Law Enforcement Medical and Rescue Training course.

²³ Atts. 50, 96.

²⁴ Officer Saviano was apparently mistaken about the nature of the investigative alert, which actually identified [REDACTED] as the victim of an aggravated battery whom detectives needed to re-interview. Att. 24.

██████. Officer Saviano stated he was at the 15th District station when the vehicle pursuit occurred, and he had no involvement in the incident or contact with the involved officers.

b. Digital Evidence

COPA obtained and reviewed the **red light camera video**²⁵ from the Chicago Department of Transportation (CDOT). The camera, located at the intersection of Chicago Avenue and Cicero Avenue, records the eastbound and northbound traffic. At approximately 9:20:00 pm on June 8, 2019, the camera captures the Kia travelling eastbound on Chicago Avenue, followed by an unmarked police SUV with activated emergency lights. The traffic signal at Cicero Avenue was green when both vehicles went through the intersection. The video shows light-to-moderate vehicular traffic, light pedestrian traffic, dry roads, good artificial lighting, and clear weather.

COPA obtained and reviewed the June 8, 2019 video footage from **Police Observation Device (POD) #7212, POD #7415, and POD #7190 (OEMC/Operation Virtual Shield)**²⁶. At 9:19:52 pm, POD #7212 captures the Kia driving eastbound on Chicago Avenue, past Lamon Avenue. Three seconds later, an unmarked police SUV with its emergency lights activated follows in the same direction. At 9:20:07 pm, POD #7415 captures both vehicles continuing to drive eastbound on Chicago Avenue, past Kilpatrick Avenue. At 9:21:33 pm, POD #7190 shows the Kia speed out of the CTA lot and turn southbound onto Pulaski Road. The police SUV—its emergency lights still activated—follows approximately five seconds later. All three POD videos show light vehicular traffic, no pedestrian traffic, dry roads, good artificial lighting, and clear weather.

COPA obtained and reviewed the **BWC videos of Officer Kulisek**²⁷ relative to this incident. Officer Kulisek's first BWC video begins at 9:19:10 pm, as the officers' vehicle travels southbound on Lavergne Avenue. The vehicle, now known to be an unmarked police SUV, approaches a red light at the intersection of Chicago Avenue and Lavergne Avenue, pulls into the right lane, and comes to a brief stop. Seconds later, the light turns green and the police SUV turns left onto Chicago Avenue. The driver of the police SUV, now known to be Officer Gorski, activates the vehicle's emergency lights and pulls over on the south side of Chicago Avenue. As Officer Kulisek opens the front passenger's door and begins to exit the vehicle, his BWC captures a red Kia sedan stopped in front of the police SUV. Almost immediately, the Kia appears to drive away from the traffic stop, and Officer Kulisek gets back in the police SUV. Officer Kulisek asks, "You got it Nolf [sic], or me?"²⁸ then shows Officer Nolfi the Kia's plate number on their PDT²⁹. As the police SUV accelerates eastbound on Chicago Avenue, Officer Kulisek deactivates his BWC at 9:19:59 pm, approximately ten seconds after getting back into the vehicle.

Officer Kulisek's second BWC video begins approximately 90 seconds later, as the officers' vehicle exits the CTA lot. Officer Gorski makes a right turn onto Pulaski Road, then

²⁵ Att. 106.

²⁶ Atts. 9-10.

²⁷ Atts. 12-13. The timestamp on all BWCs is set to Universal Coordinated Time (UTC), which is five hours ahead of Central Standard Time (CST). For the purposes of this report, all times have been adjusted to CST.

²⁸ Att. 12 at 9:19:46 pm. These are the first words recorded by Officer Kulisek's BWC, as the first 30 seconds, of his BWC video, were stored without audio. As a result, any conversation inside the officers' vehicle up to this point was not recorded.

²⁹ Portable data terminal.

deactivates their emergency equipment at 9:21:45 pm. At that point, the police SUV appears to be just south of Ohio Street. As Officer Gorski continues driving southbound on Pulaski Road, Officer Kulisek points at something in front of their vehicle. At 9:22:00 pm, Officer Gorski stops at the location of the crash site, and the officers exit their vehicle. Officer Kulisek approaches the driver's side of the Kia, which is stopped in the northbound lane of Pulaski Road, facing east. The vehicle has severe front-end damage, and the roof is missing. Officer Kulisek uses the flashlight attached to his weapon to illuminate the inside of the Kia, revealing both front seats are lying back flat. A black male wearing a white hoodie, now identified as ██████████, is lying face down in the driver's seat, unresponsive. A black male, now identified as ██████████, is lying face up in the passenger's seat. He is moving slightly, but not communicating. As Officer Nolfi approaches the Kia, Officer Kulisek tells him, "They're not looking good, but I don't know if there is a gun."³⁰ He repeats his concern about a possible firearm multiple times.

Officer Kulisek asks Officer Gorski about the condition of the Honda's occupants, and the two officers switch places. Officer Kulisek approaches the Honda, which is stopped in the northbound lane of Pulaski Road, facing northwest. The vehicle's bumper is missing, and the driver's side hood, roof, and A & B pillars are crushed. A Hispanic female, now identified as ██████████, is standing next to the front passenger's side door. The driver and rear seat passenger, now identified as ██████████ and ██████████, are still inside the Honda. ██████████'s right hand appears to be covered in blood and appears to be immobilized by the damaged vehicle and airbags. Officer Kulisek stays with her until EMS arrives and begins the process of extricating her from the vehicle.

COPA obtained and reviewed the **BWC videos of Officers Gorski³¹ and Nolfi³²** relative to this incident. Officer Gorski's BWC video begins at 9:21:33 pm, as the police SUV, with its emergency lights activated, turns right onto Pulaski Road. Officer Nolfi's BWC video begins at 9:22:04 pm, when he exits the police SUV at the location of the crash site. Both videos show the aftermath of the traffic crash, but neither contains any relevant information beyond what is captured in Officer Kulisek's BWC video.

COPA requested the **In-Car Camera (ICC) Video³³** for Beat 1562B (Vehicle #4655), but the vehicle was not equipped with an ICC.

COPA requested the **security camera video from the CTA Chicago Avenue Garage³⁴** at 642 N. Pulaski Road. CTA managers related the exterior cameras were not operational.

³⁰ Att. 13 at 9:22:14 pm.

³¹ Att. 15.

³² Att. 14. COPA also obtained and reviewed six BWC videos from responding officers, but none of the videos captured any portion of the pursuit or the traffic crash. Att. 104.

³³ Atts. 11, 103. COPA obtained and reviewed six ICC videos from responding officers, but none of the videos contained any relevant footage. Att. 105.

³⁴ Att. 22.

The OEMC event queries³⁵ and Zone 12 radio transmissions³⁶ document the following relevant and material communications:

- 9:19:46 pm: Officer Nolfi informs OEMC, “1562B. We got a car taking off on us. Westbound³⁷ on Chicago. Approaching Cicero, red Kia.”
- 9:20:00 pm: Officer Nolfi: Going eastbound, passing Cicero. [REDACTED]. Occupied one time by a male black. Approaching, uh, Kilpatrick here.
- 9:20:36 pm: Officer Nolfi continues to provide the location of the Kia, stating it turned southbound on Kostner Avenue, into the CTA lot.
- 9:21:32 pm: Officer Nolfi relays that the Kia is out of the CTA lot, and traveling southbound on Pulaski Road. He adds, “He’s way up there.”
- 9:21:47 pm: The dispatcher asks if the driver is “wanted just for traffic.” Officer Nolfi responds, “Yeah.”
- 9:21:54 pm: The dispatcher asks if the officers still have eyes on the Kia, or if they lost sight of it. There is no answer for approximately five seconds.
- 9:22:00 pm: Officer Nolfi informs OEMC the Kia crashed at Pulaski Road and Kinzie Street. Officer Nolfi and/or Officer Kulisek request EMS approximately ten seconds later.

c. Physical Evidence

The GPS data³⁸ for Beat 1562B (Vehicle #4655) reveals that at 9:17:21 pm, the officers were traveling northbound, at 3 mph, on the 900 block of N. Lamon Avenue. Approximately two minutes later, they were on the 900 block of N. Lavergne Avenue, traveling southbound at 41 mph. At 9:19:23 pm, the officers slowed to 23 mph as they approached the intersection of Chicago Avenue and Lavergne Avenue. The next data point is 30 seconds later, by which time the officers had turned eastbound on Chicago and passed 4935 W. Chicago Avenue (the location where they curbed the Kia). They continued eastbound on Chicago Avenue at 47-56 mph, turned southbound on Kostner Ave., and entered the CTA lot at approximately 9:20:44 pm. The officers drove through the CTA lot at 35-41 mph, then turned southbound on Pulaski Road. At 9:21:45 pm, the officers’ vehicle reached its maximum speed of 59 mph at approximately 600 N. Pulaski Road. Eleven seconds later, the vehicle slowed to 42 mph at approximately 438 N. Pulaski Road, then stopped at 421 N. Pulaski Road (the location of the collision).

The Evidence Photographs³⁹ document the traffic crash scene at 421 N. Pulaski Road. The photos show the Kia and the Honda underneath a viaduct in the northbound lane on Pulaski Road. The Kia is facing east, and the Honda is facing north. The Kia has a crumpled hood and

³⁵ Att.16.

³⁶ The radio transmissions quoted herein were transcribed by a COPA investigator. They do not include every transmission made within this timeframe. For the full content, see Atts. 46, 68.

³⁷ Officer Nolfi initially misstated that they were travelling westbound, but corrected the direction in future dispatches.

³⁸ Global Positioning System. Atts. 36-37.

³⁹ Att. 70.

trunk, missing roof, and severe front end damage. The Honda has a crushed front driver's side, with damage to the hood, fender, door pillars, and roof.

On June 14, 2019, COPA obtained and executed **Search Warrant #** [REDACTED]⁴⁰, which authorized the search, seizure, and analysis of evidence from the Kia. A CPD Major Accident Investigation Unit (MAIU) traffic specialist extracted the airbag control module (ACM) from the Kia, but it was subsequently determined that MAIU did not have the equipment to read the data from the ACM's event data recorder.⁴¹ No contraband or other evidence was recovered from the vehicle.

d. Medical Evidence

The **Chicago Fire Department (CFD) Ambulance Report for** [REDACTED]⁴² states paramedics from Ambulance 64 arrived at the scene at 9:34:33 pm. Prior to their arrival, EMS personnel from Engine 95⁴³ found a patient, now known to be [REDACTED] "splayed across the vehicle."⁴⁴ They extracted him from the vehicle, placed him on a backboard in the street, and determined he was in asystole. The report notes [REDACTED] had severe injuries to his skull and torso, and both arms appeared to be broken. Paramedics assessed [REDACTED] to be dead on arrival, and they transported his body to Norwegian American Hospital.

The **Autopsy Report for** [REDACTED]⁴⁵ indicates Dr. [REDACTED] of the Cook County Medical Examiner's Office performed the postmortem examination of [REDACTED] on June 9, 2019. The report identifies internal and external injuries throughout [REDACTED]'s body, including multiple organ lacerations and fractures to his skull, spine, ribs, sternum, and both arms. A toxicology analysis revealed [REDACTED] had ecstasy and marijuana in his system at the time of his death. The medical examiner determined the cause of death was multiple injuries due to a motor vehicle collision, and the manner of death was accident.

The **CFD Report for** [REDACTED]⁴⁶ states paramedics from Ambulance 10 arrived at the scene at approximately 9:33 pm. Prior to their arrival, EMS personnel from Engine 95 extracted [REDACTED] from the front passenger seat of the vehicle. [REDACTED] was unresponsive, with fixed pupils and multiple injuries, including a righthand avulsion, an open knee wound, and multiple rib fractures. Paramedics transported [REDACTED] to Stroger Hospital, where they arrived at approximately 9:50 pm.

The **Autopsy Report for** [REDACTED]⁴⁷ indicates Dr. [REDACTED] of the Cook County Medical Examiner's Office performed the postmortem examination of [REDACTED] on June 10, 2019. The report identifies multiple blunt force injuries to the head, neck, torso, genitalia, and extremities, as well

⁴⁰ Atts. 19-20.

⁴¹ Att. 30, p. 17. MAIU's reports do not estimate the speed of the Kia at the time of the collision.

⁴² Att. 62.

⁴³ The CFD report completed for Engine 95 documented it was the first emergency vehicle to arrive at the scene, at approximately 9:29 pm. Engine 95 personnel did initial triage and treatment on five patients, until paramedics arrived and assumed care. Att. 67.

⁴⁴ Att. 62, p. 1.

⁴⁵ Att. 78.

⁴⁶ Att. 63.

⁴⁷ Att. 99. [REDACTED] was pronounced deceased at 5:05 am on June 9, 2019, at Stroger Hospital (Att. 99, p. 15).

as internal hemorrhaging, lacerations, and contusions.⁴⁸ A toxicology analysis revealed ██████ had ecstasy, marijuana, and fentanyl in his system at the time of his death. The medical examiner determined the cause of death was multiple injuries due to a motor vehicle crash, and the manner of death was accident.

The **CFD Reports for ██████, ██████, and ██████**⁴⁹ indicate the Honda was severely damaged on all sides, and there was a pole on top of the vehicle that was intruding over ██████'s head. After CFD personnel extracted ██████ from the driver's seat of the vehicle, paramedics from Ambulance 52 found her to be alert, with altered mental status, but no obvious injuries. She was behaving erratically and alternatively screaming, singing, and attempting to remove all medical equipment. Paramedics did not detect an odor of alcohol. They transported ██████ via Ambulance 52, to Mt. Sinai Hospital.

Paramedics from Ambulances 15 and 23 found ██████ and ██████ conscious and ambulatory at the scene. ██████ (age 16) reported she was the front seat passenger and blacked out when the collision occurred. ██████ (age 18) stated she was the backseat passenger, but paramedics noted she was confused and did not know she had been in an accident. Paramedics transported ██████ to Mt. Sinai Hospital and Francisco to Stroger Hospital.

e. Documentary Evidence

██████'s **juvenile court records**⁵⁰ indicate on August 31, 2018, he was arrested by Cook County Sheriff's Police Department (CCSPD) officers, for attempted murder and possessing a stolen vehicle (PSMV). According to the arrest report, ██████ admitted that while driving a stolen vehicle, which he purchased on the street for \$50.00; he noticed a police vehicle following him. ██████ turned into an alley in an attempt to evade the police vehicle, at which point he observed a second police vehicle approaching in front of him. Both police vehicles stopped, and officers exited with their weapons drawn. ██████ told detectives he attempted to drive around the passenger's side of the police vehicle in front of him. As he accelerated toward the vehicle, the officer on the passenger's side discharged his weapon at ██████. ██████ stopped his vehicle and was taken into custody by the Cook County Sheriff's Police Department.

On September 1, 2018, ██████ was charged, as a juvenile, with attempted murder and three counts of PSMV. On October 19, 2018, the Court dismissed the attempted murder charge and ██████ pled guilty to PSMV. He was subsequently sentenced to 30 months of probation. On February 15, 2019, ██████ failed to appear in court in response to an alleged violation of probation, and a warrant was issued for his arrest. On April 11, 2019, the Court ordered a copy of the juvenile warrant sent to CPD.

⁴⁸ Two remote projectiles (fired bullets) encased in fibrous tissue were recovered from ██████' left abdominal wall and left back. Both projectiles appeared to be oxidized, and COPA finds it more likely than not the projectiles are from an earlier unrelated incident.

⁴⁹ Atts. 64-66.

⁵⁰ Atts. 49, 91.

The **Law Enforcement Agencies Data System (LEADS) results for [REDACTED]**⁵¹, dated June 9, 2019, identify him as “wanted armed-dangerous” under juvenile warrant # [REDACTED]. The results reveal [REDACTED] was wanted for offense code #2499, stolen vehicle, with previous charges of armed robbery with a firearm and attempted first-degree murder. The document also provides the information to contact CPD to confirm the status of the warrant with the Cook County Sheriff’s Police.

Investigative Alert #300001497⁵² documents that Area North detectives issued a no probable cause to arrest investigative alert for [REDACTED] on March 29, 2019. The alert stated [REDACTED] had an active juvenile arrest warrant, and detectives needed to re-interview him in connection with a case in which he was the victim of an aggravated battery with a handgun.

According to the **Number Plate Search Results**⁵³, Officer Saviano conducted a name check of [REDACTED] at 8:06 pm on June 8, 2019, approximately one hour prior to the incident. The next time a CPD member ran [REDACTED]’s name was 11:05 pm, approximately two hours after the incident. Both searches revealed the information contained in [REDACTED]’s LEADS results and Investigative Alert, summarized above.

The **Original Incident Case Report for [REDACTED]/Motor Vehicle Theft – Theft/Recover: Automobile**⁵⁴ reveals that [REDACTED], the owner of the Kia, reported the vehicle stolen at 2:09 am on June 9, 2019. [REDACTED] was near Iowa Street and Lamon Avenue when he saw his friends on the block. He parked the Kia, leaving the keys in the ignition and the engine running, with his cell phone, wallet, and money inside the unlocked vehicle. [REDACTED] walked about a block and a half away to talk to his friends. Shortly thereafter, [REDACTED] noticed the Kia missing. Several civilians on the street told him a black man named [REDACTED] took the vehicle. The civilians called [REDACTED] on speakerphone, and [REDACTED] told [REDACTED] he was bringing the Kia back around the block. [REDACTED] waited several hours for [REDACTED], until police approached [REDACTED] near Iowa Street and Cicero Avenue and asked if he knew the owner of the Kia. [REDACTED] informed the police he owned the vehicle, and he later learned it was involved in a traffic crash.

Traffic Pursuit Report # [REDACTED]⁵⁵ states on June 8, 2019, at 9:19 pm, Officer Gorski initiated a motor vehicle pursuit of a 2012 red Kia sedan (Illinois license plate [REDACTED]) at 4935 W. Chicago Avenue. The weather was clear, the roads were dry, and the vehicular and pedestrian traffic was light. [REDACTED], also known as [REDACTED], was driving the fleeing vehicle. The report lists the violation known to officers at the beginning of the pursuit as “felony,” and the violation observed by the officers during the pursuit as “traffic.” Officer Gorski initiated the pursuit at 4935 W. Chicago Avenue and self-terminated it at 547 N. Pulaski Road. The Kia’s highest speed was 80 mph, and the police SUV’s highest speed was 59 mph. The narrative portion of the report is materially consistent with Officer Gorski’s statement to COPA.

⁵¹ Atts. 60, pg. 305, 77, pg. 1. This information was available to the officers via the PDT located inside their police vehicle.

⁵² Att. 24.

⁵³ Att. 77.

⁵⁴ Att. 31.

⁵⁵ Atts. 52, 110.

COPA obtained and reviewed all of MAIU's case reports regarding ██████████/Traffic Accident/Fatal (Non Hit and Run) Accident.⁵⁶ The reports reveal at the time of the incident, the weather was 61 degrees Fahrenheit, clear/partly cloudy, with 10 miles visibility, and dry roads. The accident occurred when the Kia was traveling southbound on Pulaski Road at a high rate of speed, and the front passenger's side struck the west side cement wall. The collision caused ██████████ to lose control of the vehicle; it crossed the center line of Pulaski Road and rolled onto the driver's side. The Kia continued sliding southeast on the pavement into the path of the Honda, traveling northbound on Pulaski Road. The Kia struck the front driver's side of the Honda, traveled up, onto, and over the top of the Honda, coming to an uncontrolled stop just south of the Honda.⁵⁷

MAIU interviewed Officers Gorski, Nolfi, and Kulisek, who related essentially the same account of the incident they provided to COPA.⁵⁸ MAIU also interviewed the Honda's two passengers, ██████████ and ██████████. ██████████ was the front passenger and ██████████ was in the rear seat behind ██████████. ██████████'s mother, ██████████, was the driver. ██████████ stated they were on Pulaski Road, driving to Humboldt Park to look for an apartment. As they passed under a bridge, another vehicle struck the front of their vehicle. ██████████ recalled glass coming at her, and she blacked out. When MAIU investigators spoke to ██████████, she did not realize she had been in an accident. The investigators ended the interview when ██████████ became confused about recalling the incident.⁵⁹

COPA reviewed the Court Docket for Cook County Circuit Court case ██████████⁶⁰. This case was filed on June 1, 2020 by ██████████ and ██████████ against the City of Chicago. The case is pending as of the date of this report.

On October 23, 2020, the Cook County State's Attorney's Office informed COPA⁶¹ it would not pursue criminal charges against any of the officers involved in this incident.

VI. LEGAL STANDARD

a. Pursuits and Emergency Driving

CPD has established policies for use of Department vehicles "to ensure the safety of the public as well as Department members at all times."⁶² The policy states that Department members must adhere to 625 ILCS 5/11-205, which establishes exceptions for when and how officers may violate Illinois' traffic laws. However, policy dictates that these provisions "do NOT relieve

⁵⁶ Atts. 25-30, 60.

⁵⁷ Att. 30, pg. 18.

⁵⁸ Att. 30, pgs. 13-15. The only material discrepancy in the officers' accounts is Officer Kulisek's statement to MAIU that he notified OEMC when the Kia fled the traffic stop. Officer Kulisek later clarified that he provided the Kia's license plate number to Officer Nolfi, and Officer Nolfi notified OEMC, not Officer Kulisek.

⁵⁹ The reports state ██████████' right clavicle was fractured, and the results of her brain CT were pending. ██████████'s only noted injury was a laceration to the forehead. MAIU investigators were unable to interview ██████████, who was in serious condition at Mt. Sinai Hospital with a C5 vertebra fracture in her neck. ██████████'s doctor reported she tested negative for drugs and alcohol. Att. 60, pgs. 177-179.

⁶⁰ Att. 112.

⁶¹ Att. 111.

⁶² G03-03.II (effective 6/1/2003-present).

Department members from the responsibility of driving with due regard for the safety of all persons...”⁶³

Department policy further establishes procedure, responsibilities, and restrictions for officers who become involved in motor vehicle pursuits.⁶⁴ The initiation, continuation, and supervisory authorization of each motor vehicle pursuit must conform to the following **“BALANCING TEST: The necessity to immediately apprehend the fleeing suspect outweighs the level of inherent danger created by a motor vehicle pursuit.”**⁶⁵ When applying the balancing test, officers will make a determination whether: 1) the speeds and maneuvering practices engaged in permit complete vehicle control and do not create unwarranted danger; 2) the volume of pedestrian and vehicular traffic reasonably permits the pursuit; and 3) the weather and road conditions reasonably permit the pursuit.⁶⁶ Officers must also consider not initiating a pursuit whenever the suspect’s identity has been clearly established to the point that later apprehension can be accomplished without jeopardizing the life or safety of another individual.⁶⁷

Moreover, the policy places certain prohibitions on initiating pursuits. When driving an unmarked vehicle, as the officers were in this case, officers are prohibited from pursuing where the most serious offense for which the pursued vehicle is wanted is a traffic offense.⁶⁸ Moreover, officers are prohibited from continuing a pursuit whenever the most serious offense for which the pursued vehicle is wanted is either a theft (including Possession of a Stolen Motor Vehicle) or hazardous traffic violation (other than DUI) AND after the initial observed violation, the pursued vehicle disregards the traffic signals or signs when entering an intersection controlled by traffic signals or stop signs.⁶⁹

The officer initiating a pursuit will, in all instances, immediately notify OEMC that a pursuit is in progress and provide (a) radio-call identification number; (b) the **specific reason for the pursuit**, including known laws violated; (c) location, speed, and direction of travel; (d) vehicle description, including license plate number if known; (e) number of occupants; and (f) any other relevant information.⁷⁰ A pursuit will be “immediately terminated whenever an involved member determines that the pursuit does not conform to the balancing test . . . or other restrictions of this directive.”⁷¹

b. Body Worn Cameras

⁶³ G03-03.III.A.

⁶⁴ G03-03-01 (effective Apr. 9, 2019 to Aug. 14, 2020). Motor Vehicle Pursuit is defined as: “an active attempt by a sworn member operating an authorized emergency vehicle to apprehend any driver or operator of a motor vehicle who, having been given a visual and audible signal by the officer directing such driver or operator to bring his or her vehicle to a stop, fails or refuses to obey such direction, increases or maintains his or her speed, extinguishes his or her lights, or otherwise flees or attempts to elude the officer.”

⁶⁵ G03-03-01.II.A (bold and capitalization in original).

⁶⁶ G03-03-01.II.B.1.

⁶⁷ G03-03-01.II.B.2.

⁶⁸ “Traffic offense” is defined as “a violation as defined in the Illinois Vehicle Code or Title 9 of the Chicago Municipal Code.” G03-03-01, p. 10.

⁶⁹ G03-03-01.III.C.2.

⁷⁰ G03-03-01.VI.A.1.a.

⁷¹ G03-03-01.VIII.

Department members' use of body worn cameras is governed by Special Order S03-14. Pursuant to that order, officers are required to activate their body worn cameras whenever they are engaged in a law enforcement encounter, a duty which is mandatory not discretionary.⁷² The order requires officers to activate their cameras at the beginning of an incident and record the entire incident for all "law enforcement related activities," which includes, but is not limited to, traffic stops, vehicle pursuits, high risk situations, and emergency driving and vehicle responses where fleeing suspects or vehicles may be captured on video.⁷³

c. Standard of Review

For each Allegation COPA must make one of the following findings:

1. Sustained - where it is determined the allegation is supported by a preponderance of the evidence;
2. Not Sustained - where it is determined there is insufficient evidence to prove the allegations by a preponderance of the evidence;
3. Unfounded - where it is determined by clear and convincing evidence that an allegation is false or not factual; or
4. Exonerated - where it is determined by clear and convincing evidence that the conduct described in the allegation occurred, but it is lawful and proper.

A **preponderance of evidence** is evidence indicating that it is **more likely than not** that the conduct occurred and violated Department policy.⁷⁴ If the evidence gathered in an investigation establishes that it is more likely that the misconduct occurred, even if by a narrow margin, then the preponderance of the evidence standard is met.

Clear and convincing evidence is a higher standard than a preponderance of the evidence but lower than the "beyond-a-reasonable doubt" standard required to convict a person of a criminal offense.⁷⁵ Clear and convincing is defined as a "degree of proof, which, considering all the evidence in the case, produces the firm and abiding belief that it is highly probable that the proposition . . . is true."⁷⁶

VII. LEGAL ANALYSIS

a. Officer Gorski Violated Department Policy By Initiating and Continuing the Pursuit.

COPA finds that Officer Gorski violated Department policy by initiating and continuing the pursuit because (1) the pursuit was prohibited, since [REDACTED] was only wanted for traffic

⁷² S03-14.III.A. There are specified exceptions within the order, none of which are applicable to this incident.

⁷³ S03-14.III.A.2.

⁷⁴ See *Avery v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.*, 216 Ill.2d 100, 191 (2005) (a proposition is proved by a preponderance of the evidence when it has found to be more probably true than not).

⁷⁵ See e.g., *People v. Coan*, 2016 IL App (2d) 151036 (2016).

⁷⁶ *Id.* at ¶ 28.

offenses; and (2) even if the pursuit was not prohibited, it was objectively unreasonable under the balancing test to initiate and continue the pursuit under the totality of the circumstances.

1. Officer Gorski Was Prohibited from Engaging in This Pursuit Because ██████████ Was Only Wanted for Traffic Offenses.

COPA finds that, throughout the pursuit, ██████████ was only wanted for traffic offenses. The officers had two bases for stopping ██████████: (1) the offenses they on-viewed; and (2) his outstanding warrant. As to the first, the only offenses that they viewed were traffic offenses: disregarding two traffic control devices and potentially the offense of fleeing and eluding. Fleeing and eluding is prohibited under the Illinois Vehicle Code, 625 ILCS 5/11-204, and thus considered as a “traffic offense” under the pursuit policy.⁷⁷

As to the second basis for the stop, ██████████’s outstanding warrant⁷⁸ stemmed from the offense of Possession of a Stolen Motor Vehicle⁷⁹, which, likewise, is categorized as a “traffic offense” under the pursuit policy.⁸⁰ Department policy prohibits members from initiating a motor vehicle pursuit while operating an unmarked vehicle, if the most serious offense is a traffic offense.⁸¹ Officer Gorski violated this prohibition when he initiated this pursuit.

Additionally, Department policy prohibits the continuation of a pursuit whenever the most serious offense for which the pursued vehicle is wanted is a theft or hazardous traffic violation, and the pursued vehicle disregards a traffic signal.⁸² This policy specifies that Possession of a Stolen Motor Vehicle is considered a theft. Therefore, Officer Gorski violated this prohibition when he continued the pursuit after the Kia disregarded additional traffic signals, including, but not limited to, the red light at Kostner Avenue.

Therefore, the preponderance of the evidence demonstrates that Officer Gorski violated specified prohibitions in Department policy in both his initiation and continuation of this pursuit.

2. Officer Gorski’s Initiation and Continuation of the Pursuit Were Not Objectively Reasonable Under the Balancing Test.

Not only was Officer Gorski prohibited from initiating and continuing the pursuit, but COPA additionally finds that the pursuit did not conform to the balancing test. Department policy dictates that the initiation and continuation of a pursuit must conform to the balancing test, in which officers must determine that “the necessity to immediately apprehend the fleeing suspect outweighs the level of inherent danger created by a motor vehicle pursuit.”⁸³ In applying the balancing test, members must “consider not initiating or terminate an active pursuit whenever the

⁷⁷ “Traffic Offense” is defined in the pursuit policy as “[a] violation as defined in the Illinois Vehicle Code or Title 9 of the Municipal Code of Chicago.” G03-03-01, Glossary at p. 10.

⁷⁸ The officers’ belief that the warrant was for attempted murder was not reasonable (*see* below discussion) and was not a justifiable basis to overcome the policy’s prohibition.

⁷⁹ 625 ILCS 5/4-103 of the Illinois Vehicle Traffic Code.

⁸⁰ *Id.*

⁸¹ G03-03-01.III.B.3.

⁸² G03-03-01.III.C.2.

⁸³ G03-03-01.II.A.

suspect's identify has been clearly established to the point a later apprehension can be accomplished without jeopardizing the life or safety of another individual."⁸⁴ COPA finds that Officer Gorski did not reasonably comply with the balancing test because (1) the officers did not have an objectively reasonable basis to believe that there was a necessity to immediately apprehend [REDACTED] (2) the officers did not have an objectively reasonable basis to believe that [REDACTED] could not be apprehended at a later time; and therefore, (3) the necessity to pursue did not outweigh the level of inherent danger created in a pursuit and the elevated danger posed by this particular pursuit

Therefore, even if the first two prohibitions were not heeded by Officer Gorski, the balancing test itself controls and weighs against engaging in this pursuit. If Officer Gorski had complied with Department policy, he should not have initiated the pursuit, but even if he did engage briefly in a pursuit, he should have terminated it before the Kia was speeding so excessively that the officers lost sight of the vehicle.

i. The officers lacked sufficient knowledge regarding [REDACTED]'s outstanding warrant to constitute an objectively reasonable belief.

COPA finds that Officer Gorski's justification to pursue [REDACTED] and the Kia was based entirely on hunches, rumor, and innuendo about the existence and nature of [REDACTED]'s warrant, and it failed to constitute an objectively reasonable basis for pursuit. Officer Gorski's only basis for suspecting that [REDACTED] had an active warrant on the date of the pursuit was through word of mouth amongst tactical teams. His partners likewise had no direct knowledge of the outstanding warrant. The officers did not articulate any efforts they had made to verify their knowledge.⁸⁵ As a result, Officer Gorski and his partners engaged in a pursuit driven by the mistaken belief that [REDACTED] had an active warrant for attempted murder of a Sheriff's officer, when in fact his warrant was for failure to appear in court related to a violation of probation.

Even though the officers stated they intentionally searched for [REDACTED] after seeing some of his friends, not one officer made any attempt to confirm any piece of the inaccurate information under which they proceeded to operate. It belies logic, and was objectively unreasonable, that all three of these officers failed to take any action to investigate information which they admitted to knowing only through rumor, and which they knew or reasonably should have known was extremely stale.

The underlying incident, with which each officer claimed familiarity, occurred on August 31, 2018, more than nine months prior to this pursuit. [REDACTED] was arrested on scene. It is unknown, and therefore objectively unreasonable, how these three officers were operating under the assumption that: (1) [REDACTED] was still wanted for this crime, when he had been arrested on scene, and (2) nothing had changed in the case or the charges in the nine months since the incident.⁸⁶ Additionally, [REDACTED]'s case came to disposition on October 19, 2018, when he was put on probation for PSMV only. The officers claimed no knowledge of this update in the

⁸⁴ G03-03-01.II.B.2.

⁸⁵ In the absence of a warrant, the only bases to pursue were traffic offenses and prohibited under the policy and too minor to outweigh the inherent danger of a pursuit, as detailed above.

⁸⁶ Officer Gorski conceded that if the warrant had been formally quashed in court that information would not have reached him.

underlying case, even though it occurred nearly eight months before this pursuit, and prior to when they said they heard about the warrant. Any objectively reasonable officer would be aware that, in the span of nine months, a pending case is likely to change and may very well come to disposition. It is patently unreasonable for an officer to operate under assumptions, especially since they had opportunity to verify (or refute) those assumptions.⁸⁷ Had any of these officers checked on the accuracy of their information on the date of the pursuit (or even in the days prior to this tour of duty), they would have learned of their mistake. This information was available to them if they had checked themselves at their station, via PDT from their vehicle that date, or if they had they provided accurate information to the dispatcher when engaging in the traffic stop or pursuit.

In sum, the preponderance of the evidence establishes that Officer Gorski unreasonably initiated the pursuit based on false information, and that he unreasonably failed to verify the information. While all the officers had the responsibility to verify their information and failed to make any effort to do so, Officer Gorski, as the driving officer, bears the brunt of the responsibility for making the decision to initiate and continue this pursuit based upon unreliable information. COPA finds that “word of mouth” cannot and will not excuse Officer Gorski from taking personal responsibility and accountability for actions. It was not objectively reasonable for Officer Gorski to have engaged in a pursuit based upon the inaccurate and untimely information he possessed.

ii. The officers had clearly established ██████’s identity prior to the pursuit and did not have an objectively reasonable basis to believe that later apprehension could not be accomplished.

Moreover, among the considerations that officers must make before initiating or continuing a pursuit is whether the suspect’s identity has been clearly established to the point that later apprehension can be accomplished without jeopardizing the life or safety of another individual. Officer Gorski and his partners acknowledged that they identified ██████ prior to the pursuit; however, they stated they could not apprehend ██████ at a later time because ██████ had been “eluding” the police for months, and there was no way to find him later. However, the officers provided no specific facts to support their conclusion that ██████ had been eluding the police.

Considering that the officers describe so many layers of incorrect facts to support their reasons for seeking ██████, the accuracy of their vague descriptions of the efforts of other officers to locate ██████ are also in question. Nonetheless, according to two officers, they positively identified ██████. The directive does not instruct officers to contemplate the likelihood of success of a later apprehension, nor the efficiency of doing so. It only implies a viable, safer alternative to a vehicle pursuit. Additionally, the officers did not accurately assess or account for the presence of any other vehicle passengers. In this case, all three officers claim they did not see the adult male front seat passenger. The presence of other vehicle passengers, whether easily observed or not, is one of the crucial reasons that a viable, safer alternative must be explored.

⁸⁷ These officers were not even aware of the nature of the warrant that actually existed at the time of the pursuit. However, even the validity of that warrant would have required verification, to assure it had not been likewise disposed. Had the officers been aware of the details of ██████’s actual warrant, the same analysis would apply, as a pursuit is prohibited under G03-03-01 when the most serious offense is a PSMV (Possession of a Stolen Motor Vehicle) in progress. Not appearing in court for a PSMV is certainly a less serious and less urgent circumstance than the active commission of the crime.

COPA finds that it was not objectively reasonable for the officers to believe, under these circumstances, that later apprehension could not be accomplished.

iii. The necessity to pursue did not outweigh the inherent danger created by a pursuit and the elevated danger posed by this particular pursuit.

Finally, although the officers stated that the speeds of the pursuit, the volume of vehicular and pedestrian traffic, and the road and weather conditions did not create a risk, the officers minimized the amount of risk involved in this particular pursuit. The police SUV maintained speeds in excess of 50 miles per hour, while Officer Gorski estimated that Kia rose to speeds of approximately 100 miles per hour. The path of the pursuit is a 30 mile per hour zone. According to Officer Gorski's body worn camera, he stopped the police SUV at the site of the crash fifteen seconds after he was driving at 59 miles per hour. While Officer Gorski stated that he deactivated his emergency equipment and took his foot off the gas pedal prior to the crash, it is virtually impossible to determine which occurred first. Due to the minimal time between fully engaging in this pursuit and their arrival on scene, it is clear that the officers could not have been far behind in distance nor reduced their speed in any meaningful way. While Officer Gorski may have considered his actions to signal self-termination of the pursuit, it is objectively unreasonable for a fleeing driver to have processed this immediately. This crash occurred so close in time to Officer Gorski's light deactivation that it is likely [REDACTED] did not see this signal prior to crashing, and, therefore, could not have avoided the ultimate outcome.

For the foregoing reasons, the preponderance of the evidence shows the pursuit was not objectively reasonable under the balancing test. Therefore, because Officer Gorski failed to abide by the relevant prohibitions, and because the pursuit failed to conform to the balancing test from the outset, it was not objectively reasonable for Officer Gorski to initiate the pursuit. Allegation 1 is **Sustained**.

Not only should Officer Gorski not have initiated the pursuit, he should have terminated it much sooner than he did, primarily due to the high speeds and path of this pursuit. Therefore, because Officer Gorski failed to abide by the relevant prohibitions, and because the pursuit failed to conform with the balancing test throughout its entirety, it was not objectively reasonable for Officer Gorski to continue the pursuit. Allegation 3 is **Sustained**.

b. The Officers Failed to Properly Notify OEMC at the Initiation of the Pursuit.

COPA finds that the preponderance of the evidence establishes Officer Nolfi provided incomplete and inaccurate information to OEMC, specifically, the requirement that officers provide the specific reason for a pursuit, including known laws violated, in violation of procedures under General Order G03-03-01.

Officer Nolfi told both COPA and MAIUI investigators that he was the officer who provided information to OEMC during the pursuit. Officer Kulisek's body worn camera corroborates this, as it shows Officer Kulisek asking Officer Nolfi "you got it?" and turning the vehicle's PDT towards Officer Nolfi as the pursuit begins. Within the first fifteen seconds of the Kia taking off, Officer Nolfi stated over the radio their call identification number, the location and

direction (but not speed) of travel, the vehicle description and license plate, and the believed number of occupants. He did not, however, inform dispatch they were pursuing based on a warrant, nor did he report that he knew the identity of the driver.

Officer Nolfi acknowledged he did not provide the specific reason for the pursuit, explaining that he mistakenly answered yes when the dispatcher asked if the Kia was only wanted for traffic offenses. According to Officer Nolfi, he intended to say the pursuit was also based on the warrant, but the vehicle collision occurred, and he forgot to correct his mistake.

However, the policy states that officers must immediately notify OEMC of the specific reason for the pursuit. Approximately one minute elapsed between Officer Nolfi's initial transmission and the crash. In that time, he communicated the direction of travel on multiple occasions, but never mentioned their attempt to apprehend [REDACTED]. During those communications, Officer Nolfi could have attempted to verify the information surrounding the existence of a warrant. By failing to do so, and instead agreeing with the dispatcher's inquiry about traffic violations being the sole reason for the pursuit, Officer Nolfi significantly minimized the officers' reason for engaging in this pursuit.⁸⁸ Therefore, COPA finds allegation #1 against Officer Nolfi is **Sustained**.

The preponderance of the evidence does not establish that Officers Gorski and Kulisek unreasonably failed to comply with the policy. As discussed, both officers were aware that Officer Nolfi immediately began dispatching to OEMC. Therefore, it was reasonable for the other two officers to defer to him for communications. However, the evidence is not clear and convincing that they could not have corrected the dispatcher when Officer Nolfi provided incomplete and inaccurate information. Allegation 2 against Officer Gorski and Allegation 1 against Officer Kulisek are **Not Sustained**.

c. The Officers Failed to Comply with the Body Worn Cameras Policy.

COPA finds that the preponderance of the evidence establishes that all three officers failed to comply with S03-14 regarding the use of body worn cameras. The initiation of either the traffic stop or the vehicle pursuit required the officers to activate their body worn cameras. However, both Officers Gorski and Nolfi admitted they did not timely activate their cameras.

Officers Gorski and Nolfi explained that the Kia fled the traffic stop before they had an opportunity to activate their cameras. However, the policy directly addresses this scenario, in that officers are also required to activate their cameras when they are engaged in emergency driving where they anticipate that the suspect or vehicle may flee and when they are in "high risk" situations. Based on the officers' familiarity with [REDACTED], a reasonable officer armed with the same information would have anticipated the likelihood of flight. Therefore, the officers' duty to

⁸⁸ By failing to mention [REDACTED], he also failed to give notice to other assisting officers that they were pursuing someone who previously was alleged to have endangered an officer with his vehicle.

activate their cameras was triggered as soon as they recognized [REDACTED] at the red light, and the rapidly unfolding pursuit does not excuse their failure to timely activate.

Moreover, even though Officer Kulisek activated his camera as he was exiting the police SUV, he prematurely deactivated the camera as the traffic stop turned into a pursuit. Officer Kulisek admitted he prematurely deactivated his BWC, but he explained that he likely turned off his camera out of habit when he reentered the police SUV. However, as this incident progressed and became more high risk, Officer Kulisek should have reactivated his camera. His failure to keep his camera activated throughout the pursuit was not justified.

For these reasons, the preponderance of the evidence establishes that all three officers failed to comply with S03-14. Allegation 4 against Officer Gorski and Allegation 2 against Officers Nolfi and Kulisek are **Sustained**.

VIII. CONCLUSION

Based on the analysis set forth above, COPA makes the following findings:

Officer	Allegation	Finding / Recommendation
Officer Lukasz Gorski #6155	It is alleged that on or about June 8, 2019, at approximately 9:20 pm, in the vicinity of 4935 W. Chicago Avenue, Officer Gorski:	
	1. Initiated a motor vehicle pursuit in violation of General Order G03-03-01 and Rule 6.	SUSTAINED/ 180-days to Separation
	2. Failed to comply with Department procedures when a pursuit is initiated, in violation of General Order G03-03-01(VI)(A).	NOT SUSTAINED
	3. Continued a motor vehicle pursuit in violation of General Order G03-03-01 and Rule 6.	SUSTAINED/ 180-days to Separation
4. Failed to timely activate his Body Worn Camera, in violation of Special Order S03-14 and Rule 6.	SUSTAINED/ 180-days to Separation	
Officer Zachary Nolfi #19357	It is alleged that on or about June 8, 2019, at approximately 9:20 pm, in the vicinity of 4935 W. Chicago Avenue, Officer Nolfi:	
	1. Failed to comply with Department procedures when a pursuit is initiated, in violation of General Order G03-03-01(VI)(A) and Rule 6.	SUSTAINED/10-day suspension
2. Failed to timely activate his Body Worn Camera, in violation of Special Order S03-14 and Rule 6.	SUSTAINED/10-day suspension	

<p>Officer Alexander Kulisek #15054</p>	<p>It is alleged that on or about June 8, 2019, at approximately 9:20 pm, in the vicinity of 4935 W. Chicago Avenue, Officer Kulisek:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Failed to comply with Department procedures when a pursuit is initiated, in violation of General Order G03-03-01(VI)(A). 2. Prematurely deactivated and/or failed to timely activate his Body Worn Camera, in violation of Special Order S03-14 and Rule 6. 	<p>NOT SUSTAINED</p> <p>SUSTAINED/ 3-day suspension</p>
---	---	---

IX. RECOMMENDED DISCIPLINE FOR SUSTAINED ALLEGATIONS

a. Officer Lukasz Gorski #6155

i. Complimentary and Disciplinary History

Officer Gorski has received one 2019 Crime Reduction Award, two Attendance Recognition Awards, two Complimentary Letters, five Department Commendations, three Emblems of Recognition- Physical Fitness, 125 Honorable Mentions, one Honorable Mention Ribbon Award, and two Police Officer of the Month Awards. He has no sustained disciplinary history in the past five years.

ii. Recommended Penalty

Officer Gorski’s date of appointment to the Department is February 2013 and COPA acknowledges his limited amount of experience. However, as the driver of the police vehicle, Officer Gorski bears the responsibility for initiating and continuing a vehicle pursuit based on false, unverified rumors. His actions also violated multiple provisions of G03-03-01, including the requirement that all vehicle pursuits conform to the balancing test. Officer Gorski’s poor judgment and decision-making set in motion the chain of events that resulted in the deaths of two people, and caused serious injury to three innocent civilians. He also failed to activate his Body Worn Camera. Accordingly, COPA recommends a minimum of a 180-day SUSPENSION, up to and including SEPARATION from the Department.

b. Officer Zachary Nolfi #19357

i. Complimentary and Disciplinary History

Officer Nolfi has received one 2019 Crime Reduction Award, two Attendance Recognition Awards, one Complimentary Letter, four Department Commendations, 116 Honorable Mentions, one Honorable Mention Ribbon Award, and two Police Officer of the Month Awards. He has no sustained CR numbers and one SPAR, which he received on August 21, 2020 for failure to perform assigned tasks. Officer Nolfi received a one-day suspension as a result of that incident.

ii. Recommended Penalty

Officer Nolfi has been with the Department since May 2013 and, like the other officers involved in this incident, his experience with vehicle pursuits is limited. Despite this, Officer Nolfi accepted the responsibility of communicating with OEMC during the pursuit. He failed to provide OEMC with the accurate reason for pursuing the Kia, and erroneously told the dispatcher the Kia was only wanted for traffic offenses. Officer Nolfi also failed to timely activate his Body Worn Camera at the beginning of the incident. For these reasons, COPA recommends a 10-day SUSPENSION and training on proper communication with OEMC.

c. Officer Alexander Kulisek #15054


i. Complimentary and Disciplinary History

Officer Kulisek has received one 2019 Crime Reduction Award, one Annual Bureau Award of Recognition, one Attendance Recognition Award, five Department Commendations, six Emblems of Recognition- Physical Fitness, 112 Honorable Mentions, one Honorable Mention Ribbon Award, three Police Officer of the Month Awards, and one Unit Meritorious Performance Award. He has no sustained disciplinary history in the past five years.

ii. Recommended Penalty

Officer Kulisek has similar years of experience as the other officers involved in this investigation. Officer Kulisek both prematurely deactivated and failed to timely reactive his BWC during the incident. Accordingly, COPA recommends a 3-day SUSPENSION.


Approved:



5-25-2021

Angela Hearts-Glass
Deputy Chief Administrator

Date




5-25-2021

Andrea Kersten
Interim Chief Administrator

Date

Appendix A

Diagram Showing the Path of the Vehicle Pursuit



Appendix B

Assigned Investigative Staff

Squad#:	6
Supervising Investigator:	Steffany Hreno ⁸⁹
Deputy Chief Administrator:	Angela Hearts-Glass

⁸⁹ At the time of the incident, SI Hreno was a major case specialist at COPA. She investigated the incident under the supervision of SI Robert Coleman and SI Sherry Daun.