

SUMMARY REPORT OF INVESTIGATION

I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Date of Incident:	July 30, 2020
Time of Incident #1: ¹	09:34 a.m.
Time of Incident #2: ²	09:41 a.m.
Location of Incident #1:	4847 W. North Avenue
Location of Incident #2:	5555 W. Grand Avenue – 025 th District sally port
Date of COPA Notification:	July 30, 2020
Time of COPA Notification:	10:00 a.m.

On July 30, 2020, Officer Vincent Caramusa and Officer Pawel Wiszowaty responded to a dispatch call of a suspicious and/or stolen vehicle, a white Porsche Macan, at 4847 W. North Avenue. The officers parked adjacent to the Porsche in their marked squad car and confirmed that the Porsche was stolen. As the officers sat in their marked squad car, ██████████ approached the Porsche and entered it. Officers Caramusa and Wiszowaty immediately exited their vehicle and removed Mr. ██████████ from the Porsche. The officers then searched and handcuffed Mr. ██████████. Shortly afterwards, Officer Jason Cloherty arrived on the scene and transported Mr. ██████████ to the 25th District Station.³

When Officer Cloherty arrived at the 25th District Station, he parked his vehicle in front of the sally port door and proceeded to the rear passenger door to remove Mr. ██████████ from the backseat. As Officer Cloherty opened the rear passenger door, Mr. ██████████ shot Officer Cloherty in the face. Officers Michael O’Grady, Timothy Vasiliadis, and Veronica Negron, who were all in the vicinity of the sally port’s entrance and heard the gunshot, exited their marked vehicles, and exchanged gunfire with Mr. ██████████. Officer Cloherty also discharged his firearm at Mr. ██████████. Subsequently, Mr. ██████████ was struck and fell to the ground. Mr. ██████████ was placed into custody and a gun was recovered from him. Mr. ██████████ sustained a gunshot wound to the right side of his neck, right shoulder, right lower leg, and left upper abdominal region.⁴ The incident was captured on body-worn camera and in-car camera. After review of the available evidence, COPA finds that the use of deadly force by Officers Cloherty, O’Grady, Vasiliadis, and Negron were within Department policy.

¹ This is the time of arrest for the subject, ██████████ Mr. ██████████

² This is the time of the Officer-Involved Shooting.

³ Officer Cloherty was driving a marked Chicago Police Department (CPD) SUV.

⁴ It is unknown if any gunshots wounds were through-and-through.

II. INVOLVED PARTIES

Involved Officer #1:	CARAMUSA, Vincent; Star #6298; Employee ID# [REDACTED]; Date of Appointment: April 16, 2018; Chicago Police Officer; Unit of Assignment: 25 th District; DOB: [REDACTED], 1988; Male/White.
Involved Officer #2:	WISZOWATY, Pawel; Star #19413; Employee ID# [REDACTED]; Date of Appointment: July 27, 2018; Chicago Police Officer; Unit of Assignment: 25 th District; DOB: [REDACTED], 1980; Male/White.
Involved Officer #3:	CLOHERTY, Jason; Star #7468; Employee ID# [REDACTED]; Date of Appointment: August 25, 2003; Chicago Police Officer; Unit of Assignment: 25 th District; DOB: [REDACTED], 1973; Male/White.
Involved Officer #4:	O'GRADY, Michael; Star #12504; Employee ID# [REDACTED]; Date of Appointment: August 04, 1997; Chicago Police Officer; Unit of Assignment: 25 th District; DOB: [REDACTED], 1963; Male/White.
Involved Officer #5:	VASILADIS, Timothy; Star #8997; Employee ID# [REDACTED]; Date of Appointment: June 16, 2017; Chicago Police Officer; Unit of Assignment: 25 th District; DOB: [REDACTED], 1992; Male/White.
Involved Officer #6:	NEGRON, Veronica; Star #5145; Employee ID# [REDACTED]; Date of Appointment: February 21, 2006; Chicago Police Officer; Unit of Assignment: 25 th District; DOB: [REDACTED], 1971; Female/Spanish.
Involved Individual #1:	[REDACTED] DOB: [REDACTED], 1994; Male/Black.

III. ALLEGATIONS

Pursuant to section 2-78-120 of the Municipal Code of Chicago, the Civilian Office of Police Accountability (COPA) has a duty to investigate all incidents in which a Chicago Police Department (CPD or Department) member discharges their firearm. During its investigation of this incident, COPA did not find evidence to support allegations of excessive force related to any officer’s firearm discharge. COPA did determine that the following allegations of misconduct should be investigated.

Officer	Allegation	Finding / Recommendation
Officer Vincent Caramusa	At 4847 W. North Avenue: 1. Failed to timely activate your body worn camera in violation of Special Order S03-14. 2. Failed to conduct a thorough search of ██████████	Sustained Sustained
Officer Pawel Wiszowaty	At 4847 W. North Avenue: 1. Failed to timely activate your body worn camera in violation of Special Order S03-14. 2. Failed to conduct a thorough search of ██████████	Sustained Sustained
Officer Jason Cloherty	At 4847 W. North Avenue: 1. Failed to conduct a search of ██████████ 2. Failed to secure ██████████ in a vehicle safety belt without justification. On an unknown date, time, and location: 3. Failed to fully load your Sig Sauer model P226. 4. Failed to fully load one of your spare magazines. 5. Failed to comply with U04-02 by failing to fully load your firearm with only one manufacturer and style of prescribed ammunition.	Sustained Sustained Sustained Sustained Sustained
Officer Veronica Negron	At 5555 W. Grand Avenue: 1. Failed to securely attach your body worn camera in violation of S03-14(V)(A)(3).	Sustained

IV. APPLICABLE RULES AND LAWS

General Orders⁵

1. G03-02: Use of Force, effective February 29, 2020
 2. G03-02-01: Force Options, effective February 29, 2020
 3. G06-01-02: Restraining Arrestees, effective December 8, 2017
 4. G06-01-03: Conducting Strip Searches, effective December 8, 2017
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Special Orders

1. Special Order S03-14: Body Worn Cameras, effective April 30, 2019
 2. Uniform and Property U04-02: Department Approved Weapon and Ammunition, effective February 29, 2020
 3. Uniform and Property U02-01-03: Vehicles Equipped with Protective Dividers, effective June 26, 2019
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⁵ Department general and special orders, also known as directives, “are official documents establishing, defining, and communicating Department-wide policy, procedures, or programs issued in the name of the Superintendent of Police.” Department Directives System, General Order G01-03; *see also* Chicago Police Department Directives System, available at <http://directives.chicagopolice.org/directives/> (last accessed November 2, 2021).

V. INVESTIGATION⁶

a. Summary of Incident

This summary utilized information from several different sources: multiple interior and exterior third party cameras, CPD body-worn cameras, CPD in-car cameras, 911 calls, police reports, civilian interviews, witness officer interviews, and involved/accused officer interviews.

Location of Incident #1- 4847 W. North Avenue

On July 30, 2020, at approximately 9:34 a.m., Officers Vincent Caramusa and Pawel Wiszowaty were on patrol and working Beat #2534. Officers Caramusa and Wiszowaty responded to a call from dispatch of a stolen vehicle, a white Porsche Macan, at 4847 W. North Avenue. When they arrived on the scene, the officers observed the Porsche, unoccupied, and parked their marked CPD SUV parallel to the Porsche.⁷ The officers activated their emergency lights and Officer Wiszowaty exited the vehicle to get the vin number off the Porsche. Officer Caramusa proceeded to run the vin number and learned that the Porsche was reported stolen.⁸ As the officers sat in their marked squad car confirming their preliminary information, ██████ Mr. ██████ started to approach the Porsche.⁹ Mr. ██████ entered the driver's seat of the Porsche, closed the driver's side front door and started the vehicle.

Officers Caramusa and Wiszowaty immediately exited their vehicle and gave verbal commands for Mr. ██████ to get out of the vehicle. The officers attempted to take Mr. ██████ into custody, but Mr. ██████ stiffened his hands on the steering wheel. Officer Wiszowaty opened the driver's seat door of the Porsche and Officer Wiszowaty grabbed one of Mr. ██████ arms, while Officer Caramusa grabbed the other one. Mr. ██████ continued to resist arrest by pulling away, flailing his arms, and striking Officer Caramusa.¹⁰ Officer Caramusa stated Mr. ██████ struck him in the chest area several times using his elbow and the "back of his hand motions."¹¹ The officers performed a controlled take down and handcuffed Mr. ██████ behind his back. Mr. ██████ requested to be handcuffed in the front of his body because he had skin grafts, but the officers refused his request.¹²

Officers Caramusa and Wiszowaty both performed a protective pat down of Mr. ██████. Officer Wiszowaty stated that Mr. ██████ was lying on his belly with his hands handcuffed behind his back and he started to search Mr. ██████ back area, thighs, and waistband. Officer Wiszowaty attempted to turn Mr. ██████ on his side, but Mr. ██████ started to resist. The officers managed to put Mr. ██████ on his side and Officer Wiszowaty searched around Mr. ██████ waistband area and went down Mr. ██████ thighs, arms, and underneath his armpit. As the officers made

⁶ COPA conducted a thorough and complete investigation. The following is a summary of the material evidence gathered and relied upon in our analysis.

⁷ According to Officer Wiszowaty, the officers were given the license plate number from the dispatcher (Att. #96, Page 10, Line 22 through Page 11, Line 1).

⁸ Officer Caramusa audio transcript (Att. #97, Page 9, Lines 3 -10).

⁹ Att. #30 - Officer Wiszowaty body-worn camera. Timestamped at 01:28.

¹⁰ Att. #97, Page 10, Lines 2-7.

¹¹ Att. #97, Page 22, Lines 3-7.

¹² Att. #96, Page 20, Lines 20-24 through Page 21, Lines 3.

attempts to turn Mr. [REDACTED] over on his side more to conduct a search of his leg area Mr. [REDACTED] began screaming and stating that he was in pain. The officers attempted to stand Mr. [REDACTED] up, but Mr. [REDACTED] was not compliant.¹³ Officers Caramusa and Wiszowaty managed to stand Mr. [REDACTED] up and placed him against their vehicle. The officers then proceeded to search Mr. [REDACTED] again. Officer Wiszowaty stood on one side of Mr. [REDACTED] and Officer Caramusa stood on the other side. Officer Wiszowaty did a protective pat down of Mr. [REDACTED] legs and went up towards his groin area. The officers recovered narcotics,¹⁴ stolen credit cards, keys, money, and two cellphones. The officers told Mr. [REDACTED] they were searching him for weapons and Mr. [REDACTED] kept insisting, "I don't have any weapons. I don't have a gun."¹⁵

Officers Caramusa and Wiszowaty radioed for a wagon¹⁶ to take Mr. [REDACTED] to the 25th District Station, but the wagon was unavailable. Officer Jason Cloherty responded via radio that he would come over to assist the officers.¹⁷ Officer Cloherty arrived on the scene as Officers Wiszowaty and Caramusa were handcuffing Mr. [REDACTED] and going through his pockets. Officers Wiszowaty and Cloherty escorted Mr. [REDACTED] to Officer Cloherty's CPD SUV. Officer Cloherty placed Mr. [REDACTED] in the backseat of his CPD SUV without placing him in the vehicle's safety belt. Officer Cloherty then transported Mr. [REDACTED] to the 25th District Station.

Officers Caramusa and Wiszowaty stayed at the scene with the stolen vehicle to complete paperwork. While still on scene they received a call over the radio of a 10-1¹⁸ at the sally port of the 25th District. The officers drove to the district. When they arrived, the shooting had ceased, and Mr. [REDACTED] was in custody.

Officers Caramusa and Wiszowaty denied the allegations made against them.¹⁹ Officers Caramusa and Wiszowaty both stated they believed they conducted a thorough search of Mr. [REDACTED]. The officers stated that to grab a subject's genitals²⁰ they have to have permission from a supervisor to conduct a strip search. The officers stated that to receive permission to conduct a strip search they need probable cause or a reason, and they did not have either.

Officers Caramusa and Wiszowaty also denied that they failed to timely activate their body worn cameras. Officer Wiszowaty stated that the incident happened fast, and Mr. [REDACTED] walked up and entered the Porsche as they were sitting on an empty stolen vehicle completing a report. Officer Wiszowaty stated he tried to secure Mr. [REDACTED] as soon as possible and then he activated his body worn camera. Officer Caramusa stated he did not fail to timely activate his body worn camera because he had zero time and Mr. [REDACTED] was attempting to flee. Officer Caramusa stated

¹³ Att. #96, Page 22, Lines 15 through Page 23, Line 1.

¹⁴ Suspect crack cocaine and heroin.

¹⁵ Att. #96, Page 23, Lines 12-14.

¹⁶ Squadrol.

¹⁷ Att. #97, Page 10, Lines 11 – 14.

¹⁸ Officer needs assistance and/or Emergency.

¹⁹ Att. #96, Page 32, Line 24 through Page 34, Line 6; Att. #97, Page 36, Line 1 through Page 38, Line 5.

²⁰ Officers Caramusa and Wiszowaty both believed that Mr. [REDACTED] must have been concealing a handgun in his genital area. (Att. #96, Page 36, lines 4-13; Att. #97, Page 36, lines 9-11)

his body worn camera fell to the ground as he was attempting to detain Mr. [REDACTED] and he turned on his body worn camera once he was able to retrieve it off the ground.²¹

Officer Cloherty acknowledged that he did not search Mr. [REDACTED]. Officer Cloherty stated that he was standing next to Officer Wiszowaty and watched him conduct a thorough search of Mr. [REDACTED]. Officer Cloherty further stated that he would have done the same exact search.²² Officer Cloherty believed that Officer Wiszowaty conducted an “excellent search”²³ of Mr. [REDACTED] by going around his waistband and up and down Mr. [REDACTED] legs. Officer Cloherty stated that it did not make sense for him to walk five feet to his vehicle and search Mr. [REDACTED] again.

Officer Cloherty stated he did not put Mr. [REDACTED] in a vehicle safety belt because he was complaining of his hands being burned. Officer Cloherty figured if he put the vehicle safety belt on Mr. [REDACTED] he would not be able to lean forward and get relief from the pain of his burns. Officer Cloherty stated that by not placing Mr. [REDACTED] in a vehicle safety belt, Mr. [REDACTED] could lean forward and not put himself in any more pain. Officer Cloherty added that during the transport he did not hear Mr. [REDACTED] make any movements or noise.²⁴

Location of Incident #2- 5555 W. Grand Avenue – 025th District sally port

On July 30, 2020, at approximately 09:39 a.m., Officer Negron was sitting in a marked CPD SUV in the 25th District parking lot, located at 5555 W. Grand Avenue, doing station security.²⁵ Officer Vasiliadis arrived at the 025th District Station and parked behind a red sedan, which was north of the sally port’s entrance.²⁶ At 09:40 a.m.,²⁷ a silver sedan²⁸ arrived at the 25th District Station and parked in front of the sally port’s door. At 09:41 a.m.,²⁹ Officer Cloherty’s vehicle arrived at the 25th District Station and stopped adjacent to the silver sedan. Officer Cloherty exited his vehicle as Officer O’Grady drove up³⁰ in his marked CPD SUV. Officer O’Grady stopped his vehicle several feet behind Officer Cloherty’s vehicle.³¹ Officer Cloherty walked around to the back passenger side door of his vehicle and opened the rear passenger door.

²¹ Att. #30 at 01:47. The body worn camera of Officer Caramusa was observed on the ground. Officer Caramusa was observed reattaching his body worn camera at 02:15 after Mr. [REDACTED] was placed in handcuffs.

²² Att. #98, Page 35, Lines 2-9.

²³ Att. #98, Page 17, Line 21.

²⁴ Att. #98, Page 35, Line 16 through Page 36, Line 18.

²⁵ In a statement with COPA, Officer Negron stated her duty was to remain stationed in the parking lot to ensure whoever is coming in is an officer or somebody that is allowed to go into the parking lot (Att. #101, Page 5, lines 15-16 & 18-20). Officer Negron’s CPD SUV, Car #9244, was parked south of the sally port’s entrance (See Att. #2 & #23).

²⁶ Att. #39 - Officer Negron’s in-car camera (ICC). Officer Vasiliadis was observed in a marked CPD SUV at 09:39:45 a.m.

²⁷ Att. #39 at 09:40:38 a.m.

²⁸ Att. #104 – Detective Supplementary Report. The Detective Supplementary report identified [REDACTED] as the occupant in the vehicle. Mr. [REDACTED] was a plumber that worked for the City of Chicago.

²⁹ Att. #39 at 09:41:10 a.m.

³⁰ Att. #39 at 09:41:18 a.m.

³¹ Officer O’Grady’s CPD SUV was also adjacent to Officer Vasiliadis’ CPD SUV.

When Officer Cloherty opened up the rear passenger side door to remove Mr. [REDACTED] Mr. [REDACTED] was pointing a handgun at Officer Cloherty and shot him.³² Officer Cloherty fell backwards to the ground.³³ The silver sedan appeared to take off in a hurry³⁴ and Officer O'Grady opened his driver side door.³⁵ Officer Vasiliadis ran by the red sedan and discharged his firearm.³⁶ Officer Vasiliadis then ran to the side of Officer O'Grady's vehicle and he and Officer O'Grady discharged their firearms towards the rear of Officer Cloherty's vehicle.³⁷ Officer Vasiliadis yelled "10-1," and ran behind Officer O'Grady's vehicle to apparently take cover. Officer Vasiliadis reloaded his firearm as he continued to yell, "Shots fired at the police, officer down."³⁸ Mr. [REDACTED] exited the backseat of Officer Cloherty's vehicle, squatted down in front of the rear passenger door that was open, and shot at Officer Negron as she stood by her CPD SUV.³⁹ Officer Negron returned fire.⁴⁰

Officer Vasiliadis continued to discharge his firearm between his vehicle and Officer O'Grady's vehicle while yelling, "Drop that weapon."⁴¹ Officer O'Grady also yelled, "Drop that weapon,"⁴² several times.⁴³ Officers Vasiliadis, Negron, and O'Grady continued to exchange gunfire with Mr. [REDACTED] Officer Cloherty dragged himself to the driver's rear tire of his vehicle.⁴⁴ Officer O'Grady stated, "He's running,"⁴⁵ as he reloaded his firearm by his vehicle.

Mr. [REDACTED] ran and stood in front of Officer Cloherty's vehicle and continued to shoot towards Officer Negron. Mr. [REDACTED] then turned around and shot towards Officer O'Grady's vehicle. Mr. [REDACTED] ran to the passenger side of a black sedan⁴⁶ that was parked south of the sally port's entrance and shot towards Officer Negron again.⁴⁷ Officer O'Grady ran towards Officer Cloherty's⁴⁸ vehicle and asked Officer Cloherty, "Are you ok? I know that you're shot."⁴⁹ Officer O'Grady then discharged his firearm⁵⁰ while standing on the driver's side of Officer Cloherty's vehicle.⁵¹ Mr. [REDACTED] then ran in front of the Impala and discharged his handgun towards Officers

³² Att. #31 – Officer Cloherty's body-worn camera (BWC). Timestamped at 04:07.

³³ Att. #31 at 04:08. Mr. [REDACTED] was observed with his hands handcuffed in front of him and discharging a handgun.

³⁴ Mr. [REDACTED] stated he was at the 25th District for a job. He saw a marked CPD SUV vehicle drive up and an officer, now known to be Officer Cloherty, got out. As Mr. [REDACTED] was about to exit his vehicle, he heard one gunshot and immediately drove away. Mr. [REDACTED] heard additional gunshots as he drove away.

³⁵ Att. #39 at 09:41:28 a.m.

³⁶ Att. #32 - Officer Vasiliadis BWC. Timestamped at 00:02.

³⁷ Officer O'Grady was also standing by his vehicle when he discharged at this time. Officer Cloherty was still on the ground at this time.

³⁸ Att. #32 at 00:33-34.

³⁹ Att. #39 at 09:42:35 a.m.

⁴⁰ Officer Negron fired her firearm as she stood behind the front driver's side door of her CPD SUV. According to Officer Negron's Tactical Response Report (TRR), she discharged her firearm fourteen (14) times (Att.9).

⁴¹ Att. #32 at 00:47-00:49.

⁴² Att. #33a – Officer O'Grady's BWC. Timestamped at 02:12.

⁴³ Att. #33a –Timestamped at 02:12 – 02:19.

⁴⁴ Att. #39 at 09:41:58 a.m.

⁴⁵ Officer O'Grady was referring to Mr. [REDACTED] Att. #33a at 02:38.

⁴⁶ Chevrolet Impala was parked adjacent to the 25th District Station.

⁴⁷ Officer Negron did not leave the area of where her CPD SUV was parked until after the incident was over.

⁴⁸ Att. #39 at 09:43:15 a.m. Officer Cloherty was on the ground near the driver's side rear bumper of his CPD SUV.

⁴⁹ Att. #33a at 03:00.

⁵⁰ According to Officer O'Grady's TRR, he discharged his firearm thirty-one (31) times (Att. #8).

⁵¹ Att. #33a at 03:10.

Vasiliadis and O'Grady. Mr. ██████ positioned himself between the Impala and the 25th District Station and Officer Vasiliadis continued to discharge his firearm at him.⁵²

At 09:43 a.m.,⁵³ Mr. ██████ fell down between the Impala and the 25th District building. Officer O'Grady yelled, "He's down."⁵⁴ Officer Cloherty stood up, walked towards the sally port's entrance, and fired twice at Mr. ██████.⁵⁵ Officer Vasiliadis yelled to Mr. ██████ to show his hands and stated Mr. ██████ was still armed.⁵⁶ Officer Vasiliadis and Officer O'Grady then reloaded their firearms.⁵⁷ Officer Dorsch ran to where Mr. ██████ was located and observed a black semi-automatic handgun in his right hand. Officer Dorsch kicked the handgun out of Mr. ██████ hand and started to search him.⁵⁸ Officer Dorsch stated that he searched Mr. ██████ pockets, waistband, and "all around."⁵⁹ After making sure Mr. ██████ did not have any weapons, Officer Dorsch noticed that Mr. ██████ was handcuffed in the front of his body. Shortly afterwards, an ambulance responded and transported Mr. ██████ to ██████. During the incident, Officer Cloherty, Officer James Rowe, Officer James Kurth, and Officer Brian Dorsch were injured by gunfire.

Officer Cloherty stated he was shot twice during the incident. He was shot in his voice box and it fractured his C5 vertebra and landed in his shoulder. Officer Cloherty also sustained a bruise to his left abdomen from Mr. ██████ shooting him in his ballistic vest while he was on the ground. Officer Cloherty was treated at ██████. Officer Rowe sustained a contusion to his left hip area and went to ██████ for medical treatment.⁶⁰ Officer Kurth stated he was shot in his ballistic vest on his upper back and left shoulder blade area and went to ██████

⁵² Att. #32 at 01:24; According to Officer Vasiliadis's TRR, he discharged his firearm thirty (30) times (Att.7).

⁵³ Att. #39 at 09:43:15 a.m.

⁵⁴ Att. #33a at 03:17.

⁵⁵ In a statement with COPA, Officer Cloherty stated that when he stood up and walked around his vehicle, he saw Mr. ██████ lying on the ground with a gun in his hand. In fear of his life, Officer Cloherty discharged his firearm twice at Mr. ██████ (Att. #98, Page 27, lines 6-10, and Page 28, lines 5-6). According to Officer Cloherty's TRR, Officer Cloherty discharged his firearm twice (Att. #6).

⁵⁶ Att. #32 at 01:54.

⁵⁷ Att. #32, Officer Vasiliadis reloads at 02:12; Att. #33a, Officer O'Grady reloads at 03:25. The officers do not discharge their firearms again.

⁵⁸ In a statement with COPA, Officer Soly Roman stated that she was inside the district when the shooting occurred and ran outside. Officer Roman closed in on Mr. ██████ after the gunfire exchange stopped. An officer, now identified as Officer Dorsch, stepped on the handgun, and pushed it out of Mr. ██████ hand. Officer Roman then stepped on the handgun and kicked it back. Officer Roman did not discharge her firearm during the incident (Att. #63).

⁵⁹ In a statement with COPA, Officer Dorsch was inside the district when the shooting occurred. Officer Dorsch ran outside during the shooting to assist (Att. 99, Page 23, Lines 14-17). Officer Dorsch did not discharge his firearm during this incident.

⁶⁰ In a statement with COPA, Officer Rowe was working inside the 25th District Station. Officer Rowe went outside during the shooting and felt something strike him in his lower left hip. Officer Rowe did not discharge his firearm during the incident (Att. #93).

for medical treatment.⁶¹ Officer Dorsch sustained a bullet fragment in his right calf and went to [REDACTED] for medical treatment.⁶²

Officer Negron addressed the allegation that she failed to securely attach her body worn camera by stating that her body worn camera was attached at the start of her tour of duty and she did not know how or when her body-worn camera fell off her person.⁶³ Officer Cloherty addressed the allegation that he failed to fully load his firearm.⁶⁴ Officer Cloherty believed his firearm was fully loaded but he could not recall. Officer Cloherty stated he might have discharged his firearm three times.⁶⁵ Regarding the allegation that he failed to fully load his firearm with only one manufacturer and style of prescribed ammunition, Officer Cloherty stated that he loads his firearm with the ammunition he gets at the range, but he does not examine the ammunition to ensure they are all the same. Officer Cloherty stated he keeps two spare magazines on him due to how he was trained in the academy and both spares are fully loaded.

b. Physical Evidence

Summarization of the review of CPD Inventory Reports, Illinois State Police (ISP) Reports, and Evidence Technician photos.

A 9mm semi-automatic Glock, with a capacity of six (6), was recovered from Mr. [REDACTED] in slide lock.⁶⁶ There were no unfired cartridges recovered from the Glock's chamber or magazine.⁶⁷ Ballistic examination determined that five fired cartridge cases⁶⁸ were discharged from Mr. [REDACTED] handgun. Ballistic examination also determined:

- All of the officers' firearms were examined, tested fired, and found to be in operable condition.⁶⁹
- Seventy-nine (79) fired cartridge casings, fired bullets, and metal fragments were recovered from the scene.⁷⁰
- Fifteen (15) Winchester 19 9mm + P cartridges were recovered from the chamber and magazine of Officer Cloherty's firearm, a Sig Sauer, model P226.⁷¹

⁶¹ Att. #100, in a statement with COPA, Officer Kurth stated he was working inside the 25th District. Officer Kurth went outside during the shooting and felt something strike him. The bullet did not penetrate him. Officer Kurth did not discharge his firearm during the incident.

⁶² When Officer Dorsch ran outside during the shooting to assist, Mr. [REDACTED] discharged his handgun in Officer Dorsch's direction. Officer Dorsch felt heat and a bullet fly past his head. Officer Dorsch did not know he was injured until a couple of days after the shooting (Att. 99, Page 7, Line 24 through Page 8, Line 1; Page 26, Lines 4 – 24).

⁶³ Att. #101, Page 47, lines 3-20.

⁶⁴ Sig Sauer, model P226.

⁶⁵ Officer Cloherty recalled shooting from the ground while underneath his vehicle on the driver's side during the exchange of gunfire (Att. #98, Page 33, lines,16-18), but there was no physical or digital evidence to corroborate him discharging his firearm three times, only twice.

⁶⁶ The Glock recovered from Mr. [REDACTED] was reported stolen on July 2, 2019 (Crime Scene Processing report - Att. 22, Page 7). See Att. #111 for Evidence Technician (E.T.) photographs of Mr. [REDACTED] handgun.

⁶⁷ Att. #22, Inventory # [REDACTED].

⁶⁸ Att.#102 – Illinois State Police (ISP) report; All of the fired cartridge cases were Sig 9mm Luger.

⁶⁹ Att. #102, Page 6.

⁷⁰ Five (5) fired cartridge cases belonged to Mr. [REDACTED] and seventy-four (74) fired cartridge cases belonged to the officers. See Att. #102.

⁷¹ Inventory # [REDACTED]; Officer Cloherty's firearm magazine had a capacity of seventeen (17) plus one (1) in the chamber. See Att. #22.

- Two (2) Winchester 9mm Luger + P fired cartridge cases were examined and determined they were discharged from Officer Cloherty's firearm.⁷²
- Thirty-one (31) fired cartridge cases were examined and determined they were discharged from Officer O'Grady's firearm.⁷³
- Twenty-eight (28) fired cartridge cases were examined and determined they were discharged from Officer Vasiliadis's firearm.⁷⁴
- Thirteen (13) fired cartridge cases were examined⁷⁵ and determined they were discharged from Officer Negron's firearm.⁷⁶
- Two (2) gun magazines⁷⁷ were recovered from Officer Cloherty's duty belt. One magazine had seventeen (17) Winchester 19 9mm + P cartridges and the other magazine had sixteen (16) Winchester 19 9mm + P cartridges in the magazine.

VI. LEGAL STANDARD

For each Allegation, COPA must make one of the following findings:

1. Sustained - where it is determined the allegation is supported by a preponderance of the evidence;
2. Not Sustained - where it is determined there is insufficient evidence to prove the allegations by a preponderance of the evidence;
3. Unfounded - where it is determined by clear and convincing evidence that an allegation is false or not factual; or
4. Exonerated - where it is determined by clear and convincing evidence that the conduct described in the allegation occurred, but it is lawful and proper.

A **preponderance of evidence** can be described as evidence indicating that it is **more likely than not** that the conduct reviewed complied with Department policy.⁷⁸ If the evidence gathered in an investigation establishes that it is more likely that the conduct complied with Department policy than that it did not, even if by a narrow margin, then the preponderance of the evidence standard is met.

⁷² Inventory # [REDACTED]. See Att. #22 and #102.

⁷³ Inventory # [REDACTED]; Officer O'Grady's firearm was a Smith & Wesson, model 5943, with a magazine capacity of fifteen (15) plus one (1) in the chamber. There were fourteen (14) Winchester 19 9mm + P cartridges recovered from the magazine and one (1) Winchester 19 9mm + P recovered from the chamber. Officer O'Grady reloaded his firearm twice during the incident. See Att. #22.

⁷⁴ Inventory # [REDACTED]; Officer Vasiliadis's firearm was a Glock, model 19, with a magazine capacity of fifteen (15) plus one (1) in the chamber. There was fifteen (15) Winchester 19 9mm + P cartridges recovered from the magazine and one (1) Winchester 19 9mm + P recovered from the chamber. Officer Vasiliadis reloaded his firearm twice during the incident. See Att. #22.

⁷⁵ Inventory # [REDACTED] and [REDACTED]. See Att. #22.

⁷⁶ Inventory # [REDACTED]; Officer Negron's firearm was a Sig Sauer, model P229, with a magazine capacity of thirteen (13) plus one (1) in the chamber. Officer Negron's firearm was recovered in slide lock and there were no cartridges in her firearm. See Att. #22.

⁷⁷ Inventory # [REDACTED]. See Att. #22.

⁷⁸ See *Avery v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.*, 216 Ill. 2d 100, 191 (2005), ("A proposition is proved by a preponderance of the evidence when it has found to be more probably true than not.").

This standard also applies in determining whether an officer's firearm discharge complies with Department policy when no allegation of misconduct has been made.

Clear and convincing evidence is a higher standard than a preponderance of the evidence but lower than the "beyond-a-reasonable doubt" standard required to convict a person of a criminal offense.⁷⁹ Clear and Convincing can be defined as a "degree of proof, which, considering all the evidence in the case, produces the firm and abiding belief that it is highly probable that the proposition . . . is true."⁸⁰

VII. ANALYSIS

I. LEGAL STANDARD

A. Applicable Department Policies

a) G03-02: Use of Force⁸¹

The Department states that its highest priority is the sanctity of human life. In all aspects of their conduct, Department members are expected to act with the foremost regard for the preservation of human life and the safety of all persons involved. Department members may only use force that is objectively reasonable, necessary, and proportional, under the totality of the circumstances, to ensure the safety of a member or third person, stop an attack, make an arrest, control a subject, or prevent escape.

Factors to be considered include but are not limited to: whether the subject is posing an imminent threat to the member or others; the risk of harm, level of threat or resistance presented by the subject; and the subject's proximity to weapons.

Department members are to only use the amount of force necessary to serve a lawful purpose. The force must be proportional to the threat, actions, and level of resistance offered by a subject, which may include using greater force or a different type of force than that used by the subject. The greater the threat and more likely that the threat will result in death or serious physical injury, the greater the level of force that may be necessary to overcome it. When or if the subject offers less resistance, however, the member will decrease the amount or type of force accordingly as members are to use de-escalation techniques to prevent or reduce the need for force when it is safe and feasible to do so based on the totality of the circumstances.

Deadly force is force by any means that is likely to cause death or great bodily harm, including the firing of a firearm in the direction of the person to be arrested. The use of deadly force is a last resort that is permissible only when necessary to protect against an imminent threat to life or to prevent great bodily harm to the member or another person; or to prevent an arrest from being defeated by resistance or escape, where the person poses an imminent threat of death or great bodily harm to a sworn member or another person unless arrested without delay.

A threat is imminent when it is objectively reasonable to believe that the subject's actions are immediately likely to cause death or great bodily harm to the member or others unless action is taken; and the subject has the means or instruments to cause death or great bodily harm; and the opportunity of ability to cause death or great bodily harm.

⁷⁹ See *e.g.*, *People v. Coan*, 2016 IL App (2d) 151036 (2016).

⁸⁰ *Id.* at ¶ 28.

⁸¹ General Order G03-02, effective February 29, 2020

b) G03-02-01: Force Options⁸²

Consistent with the Department policy that all uses of force must be objectively reasonable, necessary, and proportional, Department members will refrain from using force against a person who is secured and restrained with handcuffs or other restraining devices, unless the member must act to prevent injury to the Department member, the restrained individual, or another person; must act to prevent escape; or is compelled by other law enforcement objectives.

An assailant is a subject who is using or threatening the use of force against another person or himself/herself which is likely to cause physical injury. Assailants are divided into two categories: (1) a subject whose actions are aggressively offensive with or without weapons and (2) a subject whose actions constitute an imminent threat of death or great bodily harm to a Department member or another person. When dealing with an assailant whose actions constitute an imminent threat of death or bodily harm, Department policy authorizes the use of firearms and other deadly force responses.⁸³

c) G06-01-02: Restraining Arrestees⁸⁴

Department members are responsible for the safety and security of persons in their custody. A person taken into Department custody will be searched prior to transport and restrained in such a manner as to prevent escape and to provide for the safety of the public, the person in custody, and the officers involved.

Department members taking persons into custody or accepting custody from other Department members are responsible for conducting a thorough search and ensuring that the persons are appropriately restrained to prevent escape or injury.

d) G06-01-03: Conducting Strip Searches⁸⁵

Arrestees will not be subjected to a strip search for any offense unless specific factors are present which establish probable cause that the search will uncover a weapon or contraband. All strip searches require written approval from the police commander, or an agent thereof designated for the purposes of authorizing a strip search in accordance with department policy.

e) S03-14: Body Worn Cameras⁸⁶

To increase transparency and improve the quality and reliability of investigations, Department policy requires law-enforcement-related encounters to be electronically recorded. Law-enforcement encounters include but are not limited to arrests, arrestee transports, searches, investigatory stops, high risk situations, and emergency vehicle responses where fleeing suspects or vehicles may be captured on video leaving the crime scene.

The decision to record is mandatory, not discretionary. The system is to be activated at the beginning of an incident and record the entire incident. If there are circumstances preventing the activation of the Body Worn Camera at the beginning of the incident, it shall be activated as soon as practical. However, sworn members are not to unreasonably endanger themselves or another person to conform with this policy.

⁸² General Order G03-02-01, effective February 29, 2020

⁸³ Id. at (IV)(C)(2)

⁸⁴ General Order G06-01-02, effective December 8, 2017

⁸⁵ General Order G06-01-03, effective December 8, 2017

⁸⁶ Special Order S03-14, effective April 30, 2018

At the beginning of duty, Department members are to securely attach the body worn camera to the front of his or her person.⁸⁷

f) U04-02: Department Approved Weapon and Ammunition

Firearms will be fully loaded with only one manufacturer and style of prescribed ammunition (same bullet type and grain weight).⁸⁸

Any member may obtain replacement ammunition for Department issued cartridges that are lost, stolen, damaged, defective, or expended in the line of duty. When the replacement of ammunition is necessary, the requesting member is to submit a copy of a Tactical Response Report and/or other related documentation to the designated unit supervisor from the district of occurrence.⁸⁹

g) U02-01-03: Vehicles Equipped with Protective Dividers⁹⁰

The Department deploys vehicles equipped with protective dividers to enhance the safety and security of Department members, persons in custody, and members of the public. Members are encouraged to utilize these vehicles when transporting persons in-custody or members of the public.

When receiving an arrestee, who has not yet been processed, from another Department member or from another law enforcement agency, transporting officers will conduct a custodial search of any arrestee to be transported, regardless of whether a search was previously completed.⁹¹

Unless an articulable exigent circumstance exists, arrestees will be secured with a vehicle safety belt, or in a squadrol or van cell, the safety device as equipped.⁹² If a specific injury, risk, or disability exists, which prevents the use of a safety belt, transporting members may consider to complete transport by a squadrol or van cell if one is immediately available to respond.

II. LEGAL ANALYSIS

A. The use of deadly force by Officers Cloherty, O'Grady, Vasiliadis, and Negron was authorized by department policy.

A preponderance of the evidence establishes that the force used was within policy. COPA has completed its investigation and determined that the preponderance of the evidence supports that the force used complied with Department policy. In coming to that conclusion, COPA weighed the credibility and reliability of all available statements and evidence discussed above.

a) The force used was objectively reasonable and necessary to protect against an imminent threat to life.

It was objectively reasonable to believe that Mr. ██████ actions were likely to cause death. Mr. ██████ possessed a firearm and used it to shoot Officer Cloherty at close range. It was apparent that he had the means, opportunity, and ability to cause death and/or great bodily harm. The force used by Officers O'Grady, Vasiliadis and Negron were used to prevent further injury to Officer Cloherty and to prevent injury to anyone else. Additionally, Department policy authorizes the use of deadly force to prevent an

⁸⁷ Id. at (V)(A)(3)

⁸⁸ Uniform and Property U04-02 (II)(H), effective February 29, 2020

⁸⁹ Id. at (VIII)(B)(4-5)

⁹⁰ Uniform and Property U02-01-03, effective June 26, 2019

⁹¹ Id. at (III)(B)(2)(f)

⁹² Id. at (III)(B)(3)6

escape of an individual who poses an imminent threat of death or great bodily harm unless arrested without delay. Once the threat was eliminated, the officers seized the use of deadly force and Mr. ██████ was taken into custody.

b) The force used was proportionate to the force used by Mr. ██████

In the instant matter, Mr. ██████ was in possession of a firearm that he was actively using to shoot. The officers used the same force in response to the force used by Mr. ██████. Though Department members are to refrain from using force against a person who is secured and restrained with handcuffs or other restraining devices, Department policy provides an exception if the member must act to prevent injury to the Department member, the restrained individual, or another person; must act to prevent escape; or is compelled by other law enforcement objectives.⁹³ Video evidence displays Mr. ██████ inflicting great bodily harm onto Officer Cloherty then proceeding to shoot in the direction of other officers.

c) The officers were confronted an assailant whose actions constituted an imminent threat of death or great bodily harm.

An assailant is a subject who is using or threatening the use of force against another person or himself/herself which is likely to cause physical injury. Assailants are divided into two categories: (1) a subject whose actions are aggressively offensive with or without weapons and (2) a subject whose actions constitute an imminent threat of death or great bodily harm to a Department member or another person. Mr. ██████ actions created an imminent threat to Department members in this case. When dealing with an assailant whose actions constitute an imminent threat of death or bodily harm, Department policy authorizes the use of firearms and other deadly force responses.⁹⁴

B. Officers Patel Wiszowaty, Officer Jason Cloherty, and Officer Vincent Caramusa violated Department policy by failing to thoroughly search Mr. ██████

Department policy orders that individuals taken into Department custody will be searched prior to transport and restrained in such a manner as to prevent escape and to provide for the safety of the public, the person in custody, and the officers involved. Regardless of whether a search has been previously completed, Department policy directs transporting officers to conduct a custodial search of any arrestee to be transported upon receiving the arrestee from another officer.

In the instant case, Officers Wiszowaty and Officer Caramusa quickly searched Mr. ██████ as he resists and makes complaints relating to his skin grafts. As the search is being completed, Mr. ██████ is ordered to stop reaching multiple times. Both Officer Wiszowaty and Officer Caramusa informed that to search a suspect's genitals, they have to have probable cause and permission from a supervisor. While it is true that probable cause and permission from the police commander is required to conduct a strip search, it has not been determined that the firearm was concealed near Mr. ██████ genitals. Due to Mr. ██████ constantly reaching and the level of resistance shown, a thorough search should have been completed prior to transport. COPA finds that Officers Wiszowaty and Caramusa failed to thoroughly search Mr. ██████. Thus, **Allegation #2** against Officer Wiszowaty and Officer Caramusa are **SUSTAINED**.

⁹³ General Order G03-02-01(II)(H)

⁹⁴ General Order G03-02-01(IV)(C)(2), effective February 29, 2020

Officer Cloherty acknowledges that he did not conduct a search of Mr. [REDACTED] because Officer Wiszowaty previously searched him. The policy does not provide this as an exception to the rule. The policy actually mandates that the transporting officer conduct a search regardless of if a search has previously been completed. Thus, Officer Cloherty failed to comply with Department policy and **Allegation #1** against Officer Cloherty is **SUSTAINED**.

a) Officer Jason Cloherty failed to secure Mr. [REDACTED] in a vehicle safety belt during transport, violating Department policy.

Department policy requires that arrestees being transported are to be secured in a vehicle safety belt unless an articulable exigent circumstance exists. In the event that an injury, disability or risk hinders the ability to use a safety belt, officers are instructed to attempt transport in a squadrol or van cell. In this instance, there were no exigent circumstances preventing Officer Cloherty from securing Mr. [REDACTED] in a safety belt.

Officer Cloherty acknowledged his failure to secure Mr. [REDACTED] in a safety belt, reasoning that this would allow Mr. [REDACTED] to lean forward since he complained of the burns on his hands. Though Mr. [REDACTED] complained of being handcuffed due to his skin grafts, the officers did not consider that a condition that prevented the use of handcuffs. It also should not have been used as a circumstance preventing the use of a safety belt as there is no evidence to indicate that this condition would hinder the use of a safety belt. Finding no articulable exigent circumstance preventing the placement of a safety belt around Mr. [REDACTED] COPA finds that Officer Cloherty violated Department policy by failing to secure Mr. [REDACTED] in a safety belt during transport. Thus, **Allegations #1** and **#2** against Officer Cloherty are **SUSTAINED**.

C. Both Officer Vincent Caramusa and Officer Patel Wiszowaty failed to timely activate their body worn cameras, in violation of Department policy.

Body worn cameras are to be activated at the beginning of law enforcement activities and record the entirety of the encounter. If there are circumstances preventing the activation of the body worn camera at the beginning of the incident, it must be activated as soon as practical. Officer Caramusa's body worn camera begins as Mr. [REDACTED] is being escorted to the CPD SUV. It did not capture Mr. [REDACTED] being removed from the vehicle and handcuffed.

Officer Wiszowaty appears to activate his body worn camera as Mr. [REDACTED] is being arrested. The buffer period begins with the arrest of Mr. [REDACTED]. Due to the late activation, there is no audio for the first two minutes of the video. It begins with the removal of Mr. [REDACTED] from the suspected stolen vehicle and is deactivated after Mr. [REDACTED] is placed in the back of Officer Cloherty's CPD SUV. Though the encounter may have occurred in a fast pace, there was nothing preventing either officer from activating their body worn cameras as soon as they began to approach Mr. [REDACTED]. COPA finds that Officers Caramusa and Wiszowaty failed to activate their body worn cameras at the beginning of the law enforcement encounter and record it in its entirety, as required by Department policy. Therefore, **Allegations #1** against both officers are **SUSTAINED**.

D. Officer Veronica Negrón violated Department policy by failing to securely attach her body worn camera to her person.

Department policy requires officers to securely attach their body worn cameras to the front of their person consistent with training. Officer Negrón informed COPA that when she began her tour, her body

worn camera was attached but after the shooting, she noticed it was not attached and was unaware at what point it became unattached to her. Additionally, it is clear that Officer Negron did not attempt to activate the body worn camera as she was not aware that she wasn't wearing it. COPA finds that Officer Negron violated department policy by not securely attaching her body worn camera to her person. Thus, **Allegation #1** against Officer Negron is **SUSTAINED**.

E. Officer Jason Cloherty violated Department policy by improperly loading his firearm.

A preponderance of the evidence supports that Officer Cloherty failed to load his firearm as directed by Department policy. Department policy requires firearms to be fully loaded with one manufacturer and style of prescribed ammunition. All of the officers' firearms were examined and test fired. It was revealed that fifteen Winchester 19 9mm + P cartridges were recovered from the chamber and magazine of Officer Cloherty's firearm, a Sig Sauer, model P226. Additionally, two Winchester 9mm Luger + P fired cartridge cases were examined and determined to have been discharged from Officer Cloherty's firearm. Two-gun magazines were recovered from Officer Cloherty's duty belt with one magazine containing seventeen Winchester 19 9mm + P cartridges and the other magazine containing sixteen Winchester 19 9mm + P cartridges. During his interview, Officer Cloherty could not recall if his firearm was fully loaded but stated that he loads his firearm with whatever the ammunition is that he gets at the range, acknowledging that he does not examine the ammunition to ensure they are all the same. Thus, Officer Cloherty violated Department policy by not keeping his firearm loaded with only one manufacturer and style of ammunition as directed. COPA finds that **Allegations #3, #4, and #5** are **SUSTAINED**.

VIII. RECOMMENDED DISCIPLINE FOR SUSTAINED ALLEGATIONS

a. Officer Vincent Caramusa

i. Complimentary and Disciplinary History

9 Honorable Mentions. No disciplinary history.

b. Officer Patel Wiszowaty

i. Complimentary and Disciplinary History

4 Honorable Mentions. No disciplinary history.

ii. Recommended Penalty

Officers Caramusa and Wiszowaty failed to timely activate their body worn cameras and failed to conduct a thorough search of Mr. ██████. This failure allowed Mr. ██████ to maintain control of a concealed firearm that he later discharged at several members causing Officer Cloherty grave harm. The extraordinary circumstances presented in this investigation are unique and require consideration of both the grave safety concerns raised by these actions and trauma endured by all persons involved. Furthermore, COPA acknowledges that violations of this manner are usually in the purview of the Department and therefore defers to their established penalty precedence in this

area. Accordingly, COPA is recommending penalty range of **Written Reprimand up to 30 days Suspension.**

c. Officer Jason Cloherty

i. Complimentary and Disciplinary History

8 Department Commendations, 4 Complimentary Letters, 165 Honorable Mentions, 1 Life Saving Award, 1 Police Blue Star Award, 2 Superintendent's Honorable Mentions, and 1 Superintendent's Award of Valor. No disciplinary history.

ii. Recommended Penalty

Officer Cloherty failed to conduct a search of Mr. [REDACTED] and failed to secure Mr. [REDACTED] in a vehicle safety belt. This failure allowed Mr. [REDACTED] to maintain control of a concealed firearm that he managed to discharge at several members causing grave harm to Officer Cloherty.

Additionally, Officer Cloherty failed to properly load his firearm. Given the injuries Officer Cloherty suffered, combined with his own negligence and lack of disciplinary history. The extraordinary circumstances presented in this investigation are unique and require consideration of both the grave safety concerns raised by these actions and trauma endured by all persons involved. Furthermore, COPA acknowledges that violations of this manner are usually in the purview of the Department and therefore defers to their established penalty precedence in this area. Accordingly, COPA is recommending penalty range of **Written Reprimand up to 30 days Suspension.**

d. Officer Veronica Negrón

i. Complimentary and Disciplinary History

3 Department Commendations, 2 Complimentary Letters, and 19 Honorable Mentions. No disciplinary history.

ii. Recommended Penalty

Officer Negrón failed to securely attach her body worn camera violating department policy. It is unclear if Officer Negrón's body worn camera was even attached prior to the incident. It is for these reasons that COPA recommends a penalty of **15 Day suspension.**

IX. CONCLUSION

Based on the analysis set forth above, COPA makes the following findings:

Officer	Allegation	Finding / Recommendation
Officer Vincent Caramusa	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> Failed to timely activate your body worn camera in violation of Special Order S03-14. Failed to conduct a thorough search of [REDACTED] 	<p>Sustained</p> <p>Sustained</p>
Officer Patel Wiszowaty	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> Failed to timely activate your body worn camera in violation of Special Order S03-14. Failed to conduct a thorough search of [REDACTED] 	<p>Sustained</p> <p>Sustained</p>
Officer Jason Cloherty	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> Failed to conduct a search of [REDACTED] Failed to secure [REDACTED] in a vehicle safety belt without justification. Failed to fully load your Sig Sauer model P226. Failed to fully load one of your spare magazines. Failed to comply with U04-02 by failing to fully load your firearm with only one manufacturer and style of prescribed ammunition. 	<p>Sustained</p> <p>Sustained</p> <p>Sustained</p> <p>Sustained</p> <p>Sustained</p>
Officer Veronica Negron	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> Failed to securely attach your body worn camera in violation of S03-14(V)(A)(3). 	<p>Sustained</p>

Approved:

[REDACTED]

Angela Hearts-Glass
Deputy Chief Investigator

3-31-2022

Date

[REDACTED]

Andrea Kersten
Chief Administrator

3-31-2022

Date